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Failing Faith in Litigation? A Survey




A decade ago, in an important article entitled "Failing Faith: Ad-
judicatory Procedure in Decline," Professor Judith Resnik reviewed
the work of the drafters of the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
who, she said, "had a belief, fairly termed 'faith,' in adversarial ex-
changes as an adequate basis for adjudication, in adjudication as the
essence of fair decisionmaking, and in fair decisionmaking as essen-
tial for legitimate government action."1 Noting a contemporary loss
of faith, Resnik wrote:
Today, it is hard to get in touch with such faith. Quoting Wig-
more's description of cross-examination as the "greatest legal
engine ever invented for the discovery of truth" often generates
chuckles.... I believe that the pressures to produce outcomes
[i.e., judges' need to dispose of cases], coupled with first-hand
experiences of seemingly illogical results rendered after exten-
sive adversarial parrying by apparently unbridled attorneys,
- Director, Mediation Program, University of Arkansas-Little Rock; Ph.D, Uni-
versity of Wisconsin-Madison, 1995; J.D., Hastings College of Law, 1980; A.B., Uni-
versity of Michigan, 1974. This Article is adapted from my doctoral dissertation from
the Sociology Department at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. I am very much
indebted to my committee, especially Mark C. Suchman, my chair, and Howard S.
Erlanger, Marc Galanter, Charles N. Halaby, and Jack Ladinsky. I appreciate the
support of a Hewlett Legal Studies Fellowship from the Institute for Legal Studies at
the University of Wisconsin Law School and a Fellowship from the Program on Nego-
tiation at Harvard Law School enabling me to work on this project. I incorporate all
the acknowledgments from my dissertation. I also want to thank Jim Alfini, Jim Bos-
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1. Judith Resnik, Failing Faith. Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. Cm.
L. Ray. 494, 505 (1986).
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have generated the emerging cynicism. If outcomes after trial
or other forms of adjudication cannot, systematically and in the
aggregate, be demonstrated (or at least felt) to be better than
outcomes produced with little or no process, if attorney misbe-
havior and incompetence are widespread, if the adversarial
model is applied in settings which render it farcical, why insist
upon formal procedure?2
Although Resnik provided some persuasive evidence of such a
loss of faith,3 she recognized that she might have been "too quick to
find a decline in faith."4 To provide a more systematic assessment of
contemporary faith in litigation,5 this Article looks at a particular
context-business litigation-and analyzes the opinions of three
groups of respondents: lawyers in private law firms who do commer-
cial litigation ("outside counsel"), lawyers employed in business firms
who do some litigation ("inside counsel"), 6 and nonlawyer executives
in business firms ("executives"). These groups have the greatest ex-
posure to litigation in the corporate setting; furthermore, because
they play powerful roles in our political, economic, and social life as
well as the legal system, their opinions influence public opinion
more generally. Thus it is especially useful to consider the extent to
which members of these powerful and respected groups have faith in
our legal system. Considering that support for court-connected alter-
native dispute resolution (ADR) procedures is often premised on a
lack of faith in litigation, this analysis also has important implica-
tions about how court-mandated ADR could, over time, boost faith in
litigation and/or undermine faith in ADR.7
2. Id. at 505 and 529. Resnik herself had not lost faith in adjudication and,
indeed, advocated efforts to restore in others what she saw as this flagging faith. Id.
at 544-56.
3. Id. at 526-39.
4. Id. at 539.
5. Although the title of Resnik's article focuses on adjudication, her analysis fo-
cuses more broadly on litigation. In addition to adjudication, litigation encompasses a
range of phenomena often occurring outside the courts, such as discovery and negotia-
tion, that are typically managed by lawyers. See Marc Galanter, Adjudication, Litiga-
tion, and Related Phenomena, in LAw AND THE SOCILL SCIENCES 152 (Leon Lipson &
Stanton Wheeler eds., 1986). The present Article, like Resnik's analysis, deals with
litigation rather than merely adjudication. This broader focus is important because,
as this study shows, many people's opinions about the courts are related to the
broader litigation process. See infra Part VI.
6. I use the terms "business lawyers" or simply "attorneys" to include both the
outside counsel and inside counsel in this study.
7. This Article is based on a research project investigating opinions about litiga-
tion and ADR. This Article focuses primarily on opinions about litigation. My disser-
tation provides an extensive analysis of opinions about ADR. See John Lande, The
Diffusion of a Process Pluralist Ideology of Disputing: Factors Affecting Opinions of
[Vol. 3:1
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To provide a context for the results of this study, Part II of this
Article summarizes some of the oft-discussed critiques of litigation.
Part H describes the methodology of the study and Part IV describes
the organizational settings in which the respondents work as well as
their professional experience and experience with disputes. Part V
analyzes the respondents' views about litigation, their expectations
about personal consequences of litigation, and their perceptions of
the opinions of influential people in their lives about litigation. To
provide a fuller understanding of these views, Part VI examines fac-
tors associated with the respondents' general faith in litigation. Part
VII summarizes the results separately by type of respondent. The
data show that opinions of business lawyers and executives about liti-
gation generally ranged from moderately positive to extremely nega-
tive. The outside counsel tend to be most positive, executives most
negative, and inside counsel fall in between these poles. The findings
suggest that outside counsel generally have faith in litigation and ex-
ecutives do not. Part VIH considers alternative possible scenarios for
litigation in the future and how these scenarios might restore or pro-
vide some faith in litigation. For the lawyers, especially the outside
counsel, relatively modest reforms to streamline litigation might deal
adequately with their principal concerns. On the other hand, sub-
stantially increased privatization of dispute resolution would seem to
be the appropriate way to address the executives' misgivings. Part
VIII also offers some cautions about the nature and likely trajectory
of privatization efforts. Part IX summarizes the arguments in this
Article.
II. PUBLIC IMAGES OF LITIGATION
The public image of litigation as reflected in the mass media is
largely a negative one. One need scarcely turn on the TV, read the
newspaper, or listen to casual conversations to hear sharply negative
public attitudes about litigation.8 While there are some favorable
Business Lawyers and Executives 133-209 (1995) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation,
University of Wisconsin (Madison)) [hereinafter Lande, Ideology of Disputing]. The
findings regarding mediation are summarized in John Lande, Relationships Drive
Support for Mediation, 15 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COsT op LrTIG. 95 (1997) [here-
inafter Lande, Relationships Drive Support for Mediation]. In a future article, I plan
to provide a more extensive analysis of opinions about ADR.
8. A Lexis search of items in major newspapers focusing on the litigation explo-
sion and frivolous lawsuits generated quite a number of opinion pieces that were
harshly critical of the litigation system. See, e.g., Joseph Perkins, Why the Litigation
Explosion? Let Lawyers Plead to This, SAN DIGo UNoN-TmBuNE, June 30, 1995, at
E5; John Leo, Litigation Lottery Makes Everyone Pay, TuA TimutN, May 16, 1995,
Spring 1998]
HeinOnline  -- 3 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 3 1998
Harvard Negotiation Law Review [Vol. 3:1
portrayals of the drama of courtroom confrontation, 9 many depic-
tions suggest that the integrity of litigation is shaky at best. 10
Critics attack the court system as one source for failed faith in
litigation. A "litigation explosion" is charged with being both a cause
and effect of a court system incapable of providing timely, affordable,
and effective outcomes."' A court system that is intended to provide
at 7; Steven Hayward, We Need a Sharp Retort to the Lawsuit Fever, ORANGE COUNTY
REGISTER, November 3, 1994, at B8; Larry Milner, We've Become Lawsuit-Happy, DAL-
LAS MORNING NEWS, July 26, 1993, at 17A. I was surprised at the substantial number
of op-ed pieces defending litigation. See, e.g., Steven Lubet, Love 'Em or Hate 'Em,
Lawyers Play Important Social Role, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, January 4, 1998, at H4; Edi-
torial, Timeout in the Tort Reform Wars; a Bit of Calm Analysis Suggests the Problems
in Civil Lawsuit Arena are Being Exaggerated, Los ANGELES TIMES, December 3,
1995, at M4; David P. Mastagni, The Great California Litigation Myth, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIBuNE, June 9, 1994, at 1. Nonetheless, my impression from casual conver-
sations with non-lawyers is that most people have more negative than positive views
about litigation.
9. As Professors Marc Galanter and Thomas Palay have pointed out, depictions
such as in the popular TV series, "L.A. Law," are systematically distorted, i.e., im-
plausible and contrived. MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAW-
YER S: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAw FIRM ix-x (1991).
10. For example, public satisfaction with the 1997 trial of Timothy McVeigh for
the Oklahoma City bombing was often contrasted with the response to the criminal
trial of O.J. Simpson, which many saw as indicative of a corrupt or ineffective legal
system. This phenomenon was captured by a cartoon in which a clown labeled "O.J.
Trial" is sitting on the throne of justice and lady justice pokes the clown with her
sword and says, "I'd like my seat back." Cartoon, CALIF. B.J., July 1997, at 8. Indeed,
even in "L.A. Law," although many of the lawyers were portrayed as glamorous, ideal-
istic, and powerful, many of the key players were clearly cynical, selfish, and petty.
11. See Patricia M. Wald, Litigation in America: Introduction, 31 UCLA L. REv.
1 (1983); Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and
Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious So-
ciety, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 6-11, 61-69 (1983). Professors Samuel R. Gross and Kent D.
Syverud, who do not appear to have lost faith in litigation, provide an exquisite de-
scription of the problem:
The essence of adversarial litigation is procedure. We define justice in proce-
dural terms: the judgment of a competent court following a trial that was
procedurally correct. When we want to improve our judicial system we pass
a procedural reform, which invariably means elaborating old procedural
rules or adding new ones-rules that govern the presentation of evidence and
arguments, rules that create opportunities to investigate and to prepare evi-
dence and argument, and rules that are designed to regulate the use of the
procedures that are available to investigate, prepare, and present evidence
and argument. The upshot is a masterpiece of detail, with rules on every-
thing from special appearances to contest the jurisdiction of the court, to the
use of exhibits during jury deliberation. But we cannot afford it. As liti-
gants, few of us can pay the costs of trial; as a society, we are unwilling to pay
even a fraction of the cost of the judicial apparatus that we would need to try
most civil cases. We have designed a spectacular system for adjudicating
disputes, but it is too expensive to use.
Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System
Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 62 (1996).
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just, principled, practical, predictable, and economically rational so-
lutions is widely perceived to do just the opposite.' 2 Indeed, many
people believe that the courts decide cases based on political and ide-
ological grounds rather than purely legal grounds.13
Critics also blame litigation's primary players-lawyers-for the
system's problems. They accuse lawyers in the U.S. of promoting
needless complexity, fomenting strife, creating injustice by manipu-
lating "legal technicalities," selfishly taking advantage of opponents
and clients, advancing the interests of the rich and powerful over the
poor and weak, and undermining the health of the economy by acting
as unproductive parasites. 14 There is widespread dissatisfaction
with lawyers 15 as reflected, for example, by the popularity of dispar-
aging lawyer jokes. 16 Highly visible elites also have criticized law-
yers in recent years, including U.S. presidents, a vice president, a
chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, a Harvard president, and
associations of large businesses.' 7
In reviewing a collection of charges against the legal system,
Marc Galanter found that many popular stories fit into a narrative
with the theme that "the system has 'spun out of control' and
12. See AusrIN SARAT & WiLLAIi L.F. FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAE.TRS AND THEm
CLIENTS: POWER AND MEANING IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 108-41 (1995).
13. See Louis LusKY, OUR NInE TmBuNEs: THE SUPREME COURT IN MODERN
AMERICA 13-28 (1993). The perception of our courts as being relatively politicized is
well grounded in fact, given our legal rules and culture promoting frequent resolution
of political issues in the courts. See Robert Kagan, Do Lauyers Cause Adversarial
Legalism? A Preliminary Inquiry, 19 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 1, 10-11, 23-27 (1994).
14. See Marc Galanter, Predators and Parasites: Latwer-Bashing and Civil Jus-
tice, 28 GA. L. REv. 633 (1994); see also William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy:
Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 29. Indeed, even Res-
nik found that the rhetoric supporting adjudication is not translated into reality due
to inequality of litigants' resources and the refusal of the government to mandate
resource supplements for weaker parties. Resnik, supra note 1, at 517-20. Moreover,
the disparate quality of legal services available to different groups of litigants and the
use of abusive litigation tactics further undermine her faith. Id. at 523-24.
15. See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAwYERs 163-64 (1989). The public is actu-
ally ambivalent about lawyers, as Professor Abel suggests:
The mass media accurately capture public ambivalence about lawyers: they
are both virtuous protectors who loyally represent clients against over-
whelming odds and also outsiders and troublemakers; they are intimates of
money and power, with all the good and bad connotations that these central
symbols evoke for Americans; and they reinforce a social order that is essen-
tial but also oppressive.
Id. at 164.
16. See Galanter, supra note 14, at 634-37.
17. See id.; Robert M. Hayden, The Cultural Logic of a Political Crisis: Common
Sense, Hegemony and the Great American Liability Insurance Famine of 1986, 11
STUD. IN L. POL. & Soc'y 95, 98-104 (1991).
Spring 1998]
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America, or its substantial productive citizens, has been brought
'down by law."'" 8 Although many people accept this narrative as a
matter of faith, the charges against lawyers and courts are hotly de-
bated in academic circles. 19
It may not be surprising that many public officials and members
of the general public are very critical of litigation. The public as a
whole generally has little personal contact with lawyers and courts20
and thus may find litigation to be confusing and intimidating. Mem-
bers of the general public are what Galanter calls "one-shotters":
even if they have several contacts with the legal system, they do not
operate with the expectation of repeated contacts.21 Given the wide-
spread media practice of systematically overrepresenting the unu-
sual and sensational, one might expect the public's attitudes about
18. Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV.
1093, 1154 (1996). For example, advice columnist Ann Landers contributes to this
theme by regularly publishing letters from readers about apparently ridiculous law-
suits. In a recent column, she printed a letter from a reader with "another beauty for
[her] lawsuit collection" based on an Associated Press story, dateline Seattle, about a
suit in which the plaintiff complained that milk cartons did not include warnings
about the effects of fat and cholesterol. In her response, she promised to watch the
outcome of the suit and keep her readers posted. Ann Landers, Ann Defends Chicago,
SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), Aug. 31, 1997, at 2E. Unless she plans to do some
independent investigation or the plaintiff wins a large award, it seems unlikely that
she will ever hear about the outcome. See infra note 75.
19. See Debate, Do Lawyers Impair Economic Growth? 17 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 585
(1992); Alice I. Youmans, Research Guide to the Litigation Explosion, 79 LAW LiD. J.
707 (1987). It is important to note that there is a vast body of empirical evidence
indicating that many deeply-felt beliefs of those who have lost faith in litigation are
incorrect. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, supra note 14 (extensive review of empirical re-
search rebutting common beliefs). Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything
About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System-and Why Not?, 140 U. PENN L. REV.
1147 (1992) (extensive review of empirical research rebutting common beliefs). At
various points in this Article, I identify discrepancies between perceptions of respon-
dents in this study and analyses of social science evidence. Not having closely ana-
lyzed the entire body of evidence, I do not attempt to adjudicate the true facts. Unless
these analyses about the actual operation of the litigation system are grossly dis-
torted, however, it appears that many people have significant misunderstandings.
20. See GALLUP ORGANIZATION, ATTITUDES TowARD THE LIABILITY AND LITIGATION
SYSTEM 180-81 (1982) (78% in a national survey of 2,013 members of the public said
that they were never involved in civil litigation and 57% said that they do not know
anyone who had been a party in the trial of a civil suit); BARBARA A. CURRAN, THE
LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC: TnE FINAL REPORT OF A NATIONAL SURVEY 186, 190
(1977) (in a survey of 2064 members of the public, 36% had no professional contacts
with lawyers and 45% had been involved with only one or two cases with a lawyer in
their lifetimes).
21. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits
of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'Y REV. 95, 97-104 (1974). As one reviewer commented,
most people are really "no-shotters" with respect to litigation.
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lawyers and courts to be at least somewhat distorted, even after cred-
iting the general public with a fair degree of common sense in inter-
preting images they receive through the media.
But what about those persons or entities which litigate repeat-
edly, the so-called "repeat players"?22 What are their attitudes to-
ward litigation and what explains those attitudes? Lawyers (or at
least litigators) are the quintessential repeat-players. They have
substantial contact with the court system and a great interest in its
operation. One might expect that litigators would have especially
favorable views of litigation because it provides them not only a living
but also a generally powerful and prestigious identity. This may also
be true, though to a lesser extent, for in-house attorneys working for
businesses. Managing activities in a confusing legal system can be a
source of power and prestige within an organization. And, though
some business leaders have been vocal in their criticism of litigation
in recent years, it is by no means inevitable that businesspeople
would see litigation as a threat to their interests. As managers of
entities that are generally the "haves" in society that often "come out
ahead" in litigation,2 they might be expected to view courts and law-
yers favorably, as protectors of their interests. Indeed, businesses
have historically used litigation when they have decided that it is in
their interest to do so.24
This study provides a detailed examination of the views of these
three groups to analyze how much faith they have in litigation.
III. METHODOLOGY
This Article is based on two complementary data analyses: (1)
qualitative analysis of in-depth interviews, and (2) quantitative anal-
ysis of survey interviews. The qualitative interviews capture a rich
expression of the respondents' opinions, including some of their own
analyses of how their views are interrelated. However, because of the
nonrandom sampling and the small number of qualitative interviews,
it is difficult to generalize from that data to the general population of
business lawyers and executives. The survey interviews, on the other
hand, permit sharply-focused and standardized probes yielding data
22. Id. at 98 (A repeat-player is a person or entity which has "had and anticipates
repeated litigation, which has low stakes in the outcome of any one case, and which
has the resources to pursue its long-run interests").
23. Id. at 97-107.
24. See YVES DEzALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEAwNG IN VIu=: INTERNATIONAL
CoiiMrRcIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
153-56 (1996).
HeinOnline  -- 3 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 7 1998
Harvard Negotiation Law Review [Vol. 3:1
that can be analyzed statistically, and, because the survey respon-
dents were selected using a randomized procedure, the survey results
provide reasonable reflections of the survey populations within calcu-
lable margins of error.25 Combining both methods in this study per-
mits "triangulation,"26 providing a more comprehensive explanation
of disputing ideologies than would be possible from either method
individually.
I conducted thirteen face-to-face qualitative interviews in south-
ern Wisconsin in the first half of 1994. Respondents were selected
using a "snowball" sampling procedure; i.e., respondents and other
knowledgeable people were asked to suggest names of other possible
respondents. There were roughly equal numbers of each of three
types of respondents: four inside counsel, four outside counsel, and
five nonlawyer executives. Interview protocols served as a general
guide for the interviews. Based on the flow of the interview, I asked
unscripted follow-up questions and skipped questions in the protocol.
Interviews generally lasted 90 to 150 minutes. The interviews were
tape recorded and transcribed for analysis. Excerpts of these inter-
views illustrate some patterns reflected in the quantitative data.
For the quantitative analysis, I conducted standardized tele-
phone interviews of respondents in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, and Florida. I selected respondents from a few states
rather than on a nationwide basis because legal and ADR cultures,
which are likely to affect (at least attorney) opinions, might vary dra-
matically by state.27 For further information about the procedures
for selecting states for this survey, see Appendix 1.
25. For discussion of the margin of error, see infra note 33.
26. MARTYN HAMMERsLEY & PAUL ATKINSON, ETHNOGRAPHY: PRINCIPLES IN PRAC.
TICE 198-200 (1983) (collecting data using different sources and methods increases
confidence in validity of findings).
27. The principal focus of this research was to analyze business lawyers' and ex-
ecutives' opinions about ADR, thus the sampling procedure centered around what I
initially called "ADR culture" but later called "mediation culture" based on responses
to the survey. See infra note 200. The literature on local legal culture attempts to
explain variations in patterns of practice based on informal norms and expectations of
regular players in a local legal system about how things are done there. See Herbert
M. Kritzer & Frances Kahn Zemans, Local Legal Culture and the Control of Litiga-
tion, 27 L. & Soc'y REV. 535, 538-41 (1993). Casual observations of differences in
legal structures, behavior, and attitudes about ADR in different states and localities
raises the possibility of analogous "mediation culture" (or "ADR culture") phenomena.
For example, the mediation culture in one state may be quite congenial to a large
volume of mediation practice whereas the mediation culture in another state might be
relatively inhospitable for mediation practice. Similarly, mediation culture in various
locales may endorse some styles of practice and condemn others. See John Lande,
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The list of potential respondents ("sampling frame") of nonlawyer
executives was drawn from the Compact Disclosure database on com-
panies filing information with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC).28 Because I wanted to analyze relationships be-
tween respondents' views and those of superiors in their organiza-
tions, as described infra in Part V.H., the sample was limited to
respondents who worked in organizations large enough to have a sig-
nificant hierarchy. I therefore constructed sampling frames to in-
clude all named officers in companies with more than 50 employees.
The sampling frames for inside and outside counsel were drawn from
Westlaw's online database, which contained listings of approximately
600,000 lawyers in theUnited States.2 9 Potential inside counsel re-
spondents were excluded if they worked for firms with fewer than 50
employees or if they did not spend at least five percent of their time
working on litigation.3 0 The sample of inside counsel was limited to
those working in organizations large enough to have a significant hi-
erarchy so that I could analyze relationships between respondents'
views and those of superiors in their organizations. The sample was
How Will Lauering and Mediation Practices Transform Each Other?, 24 FLA. ST. U.
L. REv. 839, 849-53 (1997) (describing various goals and styles of mediation practice).
In fact, analysis of the survey data revealed very few significant differences in
opinions about litigation among respondents from the different states. The few dif-
ferences observed are probably due to the fact that the Florida sample happened to
contain a somewhat smaller percentage of executives than did the samples from the
other states. For example, a substantially larger proportion of Florida respondents
than respondents in the other states said that they expected increased litigation in
their firms or from major clients would increase their opportunities for advancement.
Similarly, a larger proportion of Florida residents perceived that the leaders in their
profession believe that the court system is working well. Thus this Article does not
refer to the states of the respondents.
28. Unfortunately, by definition, this sampling frame excludes privately held
companies. However, this database includes more executives than any other
database that was available. The database is organized by firm and the listings in-
clude names of officers identified in SEC filings.
29. When the survey was conducted, there were approximately 723,000 lawyers
in the U.S. according to a recent government estimate. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENsus,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF TME UNITED STATES 204 (1993) (based on reports from the
American Bar Foundation). This estimate for 1988 "represents all persons who are
members of the bar, including those in industries, educational institutions, etc., and
those inactive or retired." Id. Thus the Westlaw Legal Directory seems fairly compre-
hensive. The Westlaw Directory seems especially comprehensive for the purpose of
this survey, as the Census Bureau figure includes approximately 84,000 attorneys
employed in educational institutions, the judiciary, and other government agencies
who are less likely to have individual listings in Westlaw's directory.
30. Westlaw has two separate databases of corporate counsel, a directory com-
piled by itself and one generated by Prentice Hall. The frames for inside counsel were
constructed by combining listings from both databases and eliminating duplicate
listings.
Spring 1998]
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limited to inside counsel with at least some minimal current experi-
ence with litigation so that I could analyze the relationships between
their evaluations of their own litigation experience and their evalua-
tions of the system of litigation generally, as described infra in Part
V.C. Because insurance companies are unique in the business of liti-
gation,31 inside counsel employed by insurance companies were also
excluded. To select outside counsel, I used the commercial law direc-
tory in Westlaw and selected attorneys whose listings indicated that
their practices include litigation. Outside counsel were excluded
from the sample if they worked in firms employing ten or fewer at-
torneys or if they did not spend at least five percent of their time
working on litigation. 32 The restrictions on the sample of outside
counsel are comparable to those for the inside counsel and executives.
Using these databases, I developed twelve sampling frames for
selection of respondents: one for each of the three types of respon-
dent in each of the four states. Then potential respondents were se-
lected randomly from each sampling frame. Survey interviews were
completed for 178 respondents including 70 outside counsel, 58 inside
counsel, and 50 executives. 33 The overall response rate was a very
respectable 66%. The attorneys were especially well-represented;
31. Handling claims and disputes is an intrinsic operation of insurance compa-
nies, unlike virtually any other kind of business.
32. To avoid overburdening organizations approached in the survey, no more
than three potential respondents were included from any single office. This resulted
in the exclusion of less than four percent (18 of 465) of the potentially eligible respon-
dents. Half of these exclusions were Tennessee outside counsel, thus the survey may
somewhat underrepresent lawyers in large Tennessee law firms.
33. In addition to the 178 complete interviews, I conducted 18 brief interviews
(lasting about two or three minutes) with potential respondents who were unwilling
to participate in the complete interviews. These included four outside counsel, four
inside counsel, and ten executives. By conducting the brief interviews, I was able to
estimate whether there was selection bias, i.e., that the opinions of respondents were
systematically significantly different from those who refused to respond to the com-
plete interview. This analysis did not indicate that there was significant bias,
although it was difficult to make a confident conclusion about this because of the
small number of brief interviews. See Lande, Ideology of Disputing, supra note 7, at
56-58. The data reported in this Article includes responses from the brief interviews
for the questions covered in those interviews.
The sampling error for the percentages of responses in a sample this size is about
six to ten percent depending on the percentages involved. For a sample of 100 in
which 50% of the respondents give one answer and 50% give another, the sampling
error is plus or minus ten percent. In a sample of 100, if 10% of the respondents give
one answer and 90% give another, the sampling error is plus or minus six percent.
See JONATHAN M. HYMAN ET AL., CIVIL SETTLEMENT: STYLES OF NEGOTIATION IN Dis-
PUTE RESOLUTION 15-17 (1995). This survey focuses on percentages of respondents
within the samples of each of the three types of respondents, each of which is under
100. Therefore the sampling errors for these figures are somewhat more than six to
HeinOnline  -- 3 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 10 1998
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more than 80% agreed to participate. Executives were less
cooperative; only 43% agreed to participate.34 The interviews were
completed in the second half of 1994.35 They were conducted by tele-
phone and generally lasted 20 to 25 minutes. Slightly different ver-
sions of the surveys were developed to fit the different types of
respondent, though the substance was the same for all respondents.
Many of the survey questions used 11-point "Likert scales," with
possible answers ranging from zero to ten with a middle category of
five.3 6 To simplify the presentation, the data are generally collapsed
into three categories: zero to four, five, and six to ten, reflecting re-
sponses below, at, and above the middle category. Collapsing the
data makes it easier to present and understand; however, it sacrifices
some important information about the intensity of responses. The
statistical significance tests3 7 were based on the full, uncollapsed
scales.
ten percent. While the sampling error involves random error, the fact that the re-
sponse rate is generally quite high, see infra text accompanying note 34, indicates a
reduced likelihood of systematic error.
34. High response rates reduce the risk of selection bias. See infra note 33 for
definition of selection bias. In this survey, the response rates for the attorneys are
quite high by social science standards, suggesting a low risk of selection bias.
Although the response rate for the executives is lower than that for the attorneys, it is
not unusually low and some statistical tests suggest it does not indicate significant
selection bias.
35. Obviously the data reflect respondents' perspectives when they were inter-
viewed and their views may change over time. I imagine that the patterns observed
have not changed radically since the interviews were conducted, especially the opin-
ions regarding litigation. It is true that in the interim, there has been extensive me-
dia coverage of some sensational trials, notably the criminal trial of O.J. Simpson.
Nonetheless, I suspect that the lawyers who generally have faith in litigation see such
cases as aberrations and these cases do not undermine their faith. By the same to-
ken, I suspect that these events reinforce the cynicism of those who did not previously
have much faith in litigation. I know of no significant changes in the nature of litiga-
tion in the interim that would substantially change respondents' personal experiences
with litigation. This article also reports some data on experience with and opinions
about ADR procedures and it is more likely that this may have changed in the interim
as publicity about and usage of ADR proceedings has increased. It would be useful to
conduct similar studies in the future to track changes in the opinions described in this
Article.
36. For example, respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with
various statements on a scale from zero to ten, where zero meant that they strongly
disagreed, ten meant that they strongly agreed, and five represented a middle posi-
tion. The same type of scale was used with questions with other response categories
such as whether the respondents thought that the courts were working poorly or
well, were satisfied or dissatisfied with their experiences in litigation, etc.
37. A finding is considered statistically significant if the probability of error due
to chance is less than a specified amount. In the social sciences, the minimum
probability acceptable for statistical significance is conventionally considered to be
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IV. RESPONDENTS' BACKGROUND AND EXPERIENCE 38
A. Respondents' Professional Experience and Organizational
Settings
Respondents worked for firms in a wide variety of industries or,
in the case of outside counsel, served clients in many different indus-
tries. The industries most represented in the sample are general
manufacturing, finance, health care, and computers. Outside counsel
had been employed by their current firms for an average of eight
years, compared with ten years for inside counsel and thirteen years
for executives.
Inside counsel in the sample generally worked for larger and
more complex firms than did the executives. Inside counsel provided
a median 39 estimate of 4,000 to 5,000 employees, including 6 to 10
attorneys, in their firms. By contrast, the executives gave a median
estimate of 750 to 1,000 employees, including one attorney, in their
firms. Close to half (43%) of the inside counsel's firms were wholly-
five percent, indicated as "p < .05." In other words, the observed relationship is con-
sidered statistically significant is there is less than a five percent chance that one
would observe the relationship in the sample data if there was not such a relationship
in the full population. It may be easier to think of it this way: There is at least a 95%
probability that there really is a relationship in the full population given the statisti-
cal relationship in the data collected from the sample. One has even greater confi-
dence in a finding if the relationship is significant at the .01 or .001 levels. Note that
one should not interpret a statistically significant finding as indicating that the rela-
tionship necessarily exists in the general population. Rather, this simply means that
the collected data support that hypothesis. The converse is also true: a finding that is
not statistically significant does not necessarily mean that there is no relationship in
fact. If an observation (such as a correlation presented in this Article) is not statisti-
cally significant, one should generally not make any inference based on the observa-
tion, such as the sign or magnitude of the correlation. See generally JoHN NETER ET
AL., APPLIED STATIsTIcs 310-38 (3rd ed. 1988).
38. This Part provides a summary description of the survey respondents'
background and experience. For further detail, see Lande, Ideology of Disputing,
supra note 7, at 65-88.
In general, the survey respondents were middle-aged men. The vast majority
(85%) of the sample is male. They ranged in age from 27 to 77 with an average of 44.
The average age was 42 for outside counsel, 40 for inside counsel, and 50 for
executives. The age difference (as well as the length of tenure in their positions
described in the text) is probably a function of differences in sampling frames. The
frames for the attorneys included both junior and senior attorneys whereas the frame
for executives included only the top several levels of executives in the corporations.
For further information on the sampling frames, see supra notes 28-32 and
accompanying text.
39. The median refers to the 50' percentile in a group, i.e., half the values are
above the median and half are below it. The median is sometimes considered a better
measure of central tendency than an average when some scores have extreme values
and thus skew the average disproportionately.
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owned subsidiaries whereas very few (6%) of the executives' firms
were wholly-owned subsidiaries.
Most outside counsel (59%) in the sample worked in firms with
offices in one or two cities. The median size of their law firm was in
the range of 51 to 100 attorneys. The vast majority of outside coun-
sels' clients (an average estimate of 82%) were businesses and most of
these business clients (an average estimate of 73%) had annual reve-
nues of more than $1 million.
Most respondents owned an interest in their firms, including
66% of the inside counsel and 90% of the executives. Slightly more
than half of the outside counsel (53%) were equity partners in their
law firms.
The different types of respondents fit into very different organi-
zational authority structures. To determine who were their "organi-
zational superiors," respondents were asked about the position of the
people whose judgments and decisions affected them most in their
current position.40 For outside counsel in this sample, the organiza-
tional superiors were divided almost equally between partners in
their law firm and their clients, with somewhat more in the former
category. The organizational superiors for approximately two-thirds
of inside counsel in the sample were non-legal executives, officers,
and managers in their firm. For most of the other inside counsel,
their organizational superiors were the top officials in the legal de-
partment. The organizational superiors for three-quarters of the ex-
ecutives were other top executives and officers in their firm. Most of
the other executives said that they were affected most by the judg-
ments and decisions of their firms' customers or clients.
B. Respondents' Experience with Litigation and ADR
Inside counsel and outside counsel in the sample had practiced
law for an average of 14 years; however, outside counsel had devoted
a greater proportion of their time to litigation activities than had in-
side counsel. Outside counsel estimated that litigation constituted
an average of 83% of their time in the prior year, compared with 57%
for inside counsel.41 Indeed, so many outside counsel devoted virtu-
ally all of their time to litigation that the median proportion of their
40. Respondents were asked about their perceptions of their "organizational
superiors'" opinions about litigation, as described infra in Part V.G., which were sig-
nificantly correlated with the respondents' own views about litigation, as described
infra in Part VI.
41. The mean percentage of time devoted to litigation is probably related to the
sample selection procedure which included only attorneys who did litigation for at
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time spent on litigation was 98%. Outside counsel also devoted a
greater proportion of their entire legal careers to litigation than did
inside counsel. Outside counsel said that they spent at least half of
their time doing litigation in an average of 82% of the years in since
they received their law degrees; this compares with an average of
62% for inside counsel. Not surprisingly, the proportion of lawyers'
current time devoted to litigation is strongly correlated with the pro-
portion of their careers in which they have focused on litigation.42
As these data indicate, for many lawyers, litigation was the cen-
tral focus of their work. This was rarely the case for executives. As
one might expect, executives had less experience with litigation than
the attorneys in the study. In fact, one needs to measure amount of
experience quite differently for lawyers and nonlawyers. Overall, the
executives had little experience personally as a party, witness, or ju-
ror, but had somewhat more experience participating in decision-
making about litigation for businesses. Thirty-two percent of the ex-
ecutives had never been a juror or witness and 40% had been a juror
or witness only once or twice. Almost three-quarters (74%) said that
they had never been a party in a lawsuit 43 and an additional 22%
said that they had been a party only once. However, more than
three-quarters (82%) said that they had been responsible, individu-
ally or as part of a team, for decision-making for a business in a law-
suit, and had played such a role in a median of four or five suits.
Thus, most of the executives' personal experience with litigation had
been in their professional capacity.
least five percent of their time. Thus these figures overstate the percentage of time
devoted to litigation in the population of business lawyers generally.
42. Correlation refers to the extent of linear association between two variables.
Where two variables are perfectly associated, if one knows the value of one variable,
one can tell the exact value of the other; in that situation, the correlation coefficient is
1.0. For example, the length of objects in inches is perfectly correlated with their
length in feet. Correlations have a negative value if the increase in one variable is
associated with the decrease of another variable. For example, if B is a point on a
straight line with endpoints A and C, the distance between A and B is negatively
correlated with the distance between B and C, i.e., -1.0. Larger correlation coeffi-
cients in absolute value (i.e, numerical value without regard to whether it is positive
or negative) indicate greater degrees of association between the two variables. If
there is no association, the correlation is 0. See generally NEWER ET AL., supra note 37,
at 172-73. Correlations indicated in the text are statistically significant unless other-
wise indicated. For further information about statistical significance, see supra note
37.
43. This excluded situations where they may have been named as parties but
were not personally involved in the litigation.
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All three groups of respondents' professional experience with liti-
gation had been more often defense- rather than plaintiff-oriented. 44
This was especially true for inside counsel, who on average estimated
that their firm was a defendant in 82% of cases that they personally
handled or supervised in the prior three years, compared with 65%
for outside counsel, and 73% for executives.
Experience with ADR varied by type of respondent. Outside
counsel had the most experience as a third-party neutral (such as an
arbitrator or mediator),45 while executives had the least. About half
of outside counsel (47%), one quarter of inside counsel (26%), and 7%
of the executives had served as a neutral at least once. Respondents
generally had more experience with ADR as partisans (i.e., advocates
and principals) than as neutrals. The attorneys had much more ex-
perience as partisans in ADR than did the executives. Ninety per-
cent of the outside counsel and 84% of the inside counsel had some
experience as a partisan in ADR compared with only 39% of the exec-
utives. More than half of the attorneys had participated as partisans
in at least four ADR proceedings compared with only 12 percent of
executives.
V. RESPONDENTS' OPINIONS ABOUT LITIGATION
This Part shows that the three types of respondents-outside
counsel, inside counsel, and executives-had sharply different views
about civil litigation.46 Outside counsel typically had the most
44. As several attorneys pointed out, the distinction between plaintiff and de-
fendant status may be misleading in some cases where the parties have claims
against each other and the formal status reflects who "got to the courthouse" or "pul-
led the trigger" first. Thus the measure of how often the respondents' firms or clients
are defendants is necessarily imprecise. Nonetheless, the concept was quite clear to
the respondents and most had no problem providing estimates in response to this
question.
45. For simplicity, I refer to participation as an arbitrator or mediator as experi-
ence as a "neutral." I use this term reflecting common usage even though mediators
and arbitrators may not necessarily be neutral in fact in some situations. See Lande,
supra note 27, at 881-82 (mediators may be biased consciously or unconsciously in
favor of actual or prospective repeat customers).
46. Respondents were instructed to give their opinions about civil cases other
than family cases and not to consider criminal cases when giving their opinions.
Family and criminal cases were excluded because preliminary interviews suggested
that respondents' opinions about these cases might differ substantially from their
opinions about general civil cases. Moreover, business lawyers and executives pre-
sumably would have greater experience with the civil justice system generally than
family and criminal cases and thus have greater confidence in their opinions about
general civil cases. Since the vast majority of lawsuits are settled without trial (and
even without pretrial court decision-making), see Herbert M. Kritzer, Adjudication to
Settlement: Shading in the Gray, 70 JUDICATURE 161, 163-64 (1986), respondents were
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favorable views of litigation whereas the executives were generally
quite critical and the inside counsel's views were typically somewhere
in between. Part V.A presents respondents' views of how well the
courts have been working overall. Part V.B considers how litigation
shapes and reflects their professional roles. Part V.C summarizes re-
spondents' evaluations of their own experiences with litigation and
their expectations about how increased litigation for their firm or ma-
jor client would affect them personally. The succeeding portions of
this Part analyze respondents' beliefs about litigation along a number
of dimensions, including a series of questions about the integrity of
the court process, the time and expense involved in litigation, and the
sensitivity of the courts to the concerns of businesses. Finally, Part
V.H considers respondents' perceptions of opinions about litigation of
key actors in their lives, namely authorities in their organizations
and professions.
A. Faith in Litigation
Respondents were asked to evaluate how well the court system
had been working overall in the past ten years or so. As Table 1 indi-
cates, both outside and inside counsel4 7 gave significantly more posi-
tive evaluations of the court system than did the executives. About
half of the attorneys and only one fifth of the executives believed that
the court system is generally working well. Conversely, about a third
of the attorneys said that the system is working poorly, compared
with more than half of the executives with that opinion.48 Opinions
instructed that references to lawsuits and litigation included cases that are settled as
well as those that go to trial.
47. Respondents were asked, "How well [do] you think the court system has been
working overall in the past ten years or so, on a scale of zero to ten, where zero means
very poorly, ten means very well, and five is right in the middle?" The average
outside counsel response was 5.4, average inside counsel response was 5.2, and aver-
age executive response was 4.2. Although there is no significant statistical difference
in average responses between inside counsel and outside counsel, it is interesting to
note that the proportion of inside counsel giving the middle response is almost double
that of the outside counsel, suggesting more ambivalence by the inside counsel.
48. The executives' opinions correspond to those in a 1993 survey of 1,255 mem-
bers of the public in California conducted by Yankelovitch Partners, Inc. In that sur-
vey, 52% of respondents said they had an "only fair" or "poor" opinion of the courts.
The study also included a survey of 251 attorneys, of whom only 20% had that opin-
ion. Elizabeth Ellers, Surveying the Future, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 2183, 2189-90 (1993).
In a sophisticated survey of Chicago residents, researchers interviewed 1,575 respon-
dents in 1984 (the "first wave") and reinterviewed 804 respondents in 1985 (the "sec-
ond wave"). These members of the public were apparently not quite as negative in
their attitudes toward the court system as were respondents in the later California
survey. Considering both waves, 26-30% described the job that the courts were doing
as very good or good, 45-47% as fair, and 25-27% as poor or very poor. Tori R. TYLER,
[Vol. 3:1
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about how well the court system has been working overall is referred
to in this Article as the respondents' "faith" in litigation. Part VI con-
siders how respondents' faith in litigation is related to the other vari-
ables discussed in this Article.
TABLE 1. OPINIONS ABouT How WELL THE COURT SYSTEM HAS
BEEN WORKING OVERALL (percentages)
Outside Inside
Counsel Counsel Executives Total
Well 51 45 20 39
Middle response 15 28 25 22
Poorly 34 27 55 38
Total 100 100 100 99*
Number of Respondents 73 60 60 193
*Does not add to 100% due to rounding.
B. Role of Litigation in Respondents' Professional Lives
Litigation played a very different role in the professional lives of
the three groups of respondents. Excerpts from the in-depth inter-
views 49 provide an especially vivid portrait of how litigation fits into
the respondents' lives. This Part considers the perspectives of each
group in turn, beginning with outside counsel.
Obviously, litigation is what litigators do. The court system pro-
vides the structure in which lawyers do their professional work, espe-
cially outside counsel who specialize in litigation. The following is a
description of the general perspective of law firm litigators by an at-
torney who had been in private practice and is now general counsel of
a business firm:
WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 51 (1990). Responding to a related question, 55-59% said
that they were somewhat or very satisfied with the way that the courts solve
problems compared with 41-45% who said that they were somewhat or very dissatis.
fled. Id.
49. In some instances, grammatical errors common in spoken language have
been left as spoken when this did not interfere with the understanding of the quoted
statements. Some of the quotations have been edited to enhance readability. Where
speakers repeated several words or used similar patterns of everyday conversation
that did not affect the meaning, the repeated words were omitted without ellipses or
brackets. All editing has maintained the substance and tone of respondents' state-
ments. Full, unedited transcripts are on file with the author. Because the subjects
were promised that the interviews would be confidential, the subjects are identified
only by number and indication whether they were an outside counsel, inside counsel,
or executive. The interviews were numbered in the order that they were transcribed
rather than the order in which they were conducted.
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As outside counsel, you want to protect your client's interests to
the max from a legal perspective. And what you're looking to do
is to practice the law. You want to push your advantages. ....
So outside attorneys are looking at "Here are the tools that I've
got. Here's what I need to do. Here's what I could do. Here are
issues that I could proceed on for my client if I'm not told abso-
lutely that I shouldn't do some of those things."50
While the litigation process may be frustrating for clients (as de-
scribed below), it can be very exciting and fulfilling for the attorneys.
The outside counsel in this study generally seemed to enjoy their
work. As one lawyer who obviously revels in the work of advocacy
said, "Our good old-fashioned bare-knuckles brawl in front of the jury
isn't such a bad system."5 1 Nonetheless, a number of lawyers, espe-
cially veteran litigators, echoed a theme that "litigation just isn't as
much fun as it used to be." Here is one example:
I don't think the [court] system today is anywhere near the fun
that it was twenty years ago or more. I think the system is no-
where near as user-friendly as it was. I don't think the system
permits the good training and experience to make the lawyers
who use it, on a percentage basis, as good as the percentage of
good lawyers was. But that again is said by an old-timer as op-
posed to a newcomer. I just think with the crowds and the cases
and the congestion and the attending attitudes that it has cre-
ated, the whole system doesn't have the same appeal to me that
it did years ago. Admittedly I'm older. But the fact of the mat-
ter is I think it's an opinion that's shared by many.52
For the vast majority of executives, litigation has very little posi-
tive to recommend it. For one thing, many executives feel that the
law generally, and the potential of litigation in particular, inhibits
them from engaging in the entrepreneurial activities that they are in
business to do. One executive said:
As I look back at my business career, I have an antipathy for
precedent at times because I find it constraining in terms of the
ability to break new ground. So I don't necessarily always look
for, "Well, how was it done before? Or what did some previous
court decide? Or what did some previous regulatory body con-
clude on this?" as opposed to "Give me the facts and circum-
stances today and where we want to go in the future. Try to
50. Interview with inside counsel 4 (Mar. 16, 1994).
51. Interview with outside counsel 1 (Mar. 17, 1994).
52. Interview with outside counsel 3 (Mar. 23, 1994).
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define a problem or the opportunity in terms of the visions of the
future as opposed to the precedent in the past."5 3
The following quote displays a similar perspective, highlighting how
preserving business relationships is much more important than the
law, which is presumably the primary consideration in litigation.
Although this excerpt is from the general counsel of a conglomerate
firm, it probably reflects the views of many executives as well:
Many of our businesses are with an industry in which it's pri-
marily a customer-dominated market. In other words, if I have
a dispute with a car company,... the overriding consideration is
the long-term relationship. Whether we win, lose, or draw, the
economics, how strong our case is-none of that matters."
Moreover, on a personal level, participating in litigation provides ex-
ecutives with few rewards.
[Litigation] doesn't fall within [executives'] day-to-day job classi-
fication. They're not going to get any stars from anybody for
spending a lot of time on litigation, so they turn it over to law-
yers. They rely on the lawyers to report back to them. There's
seldom any upside to being involved in litigation. s5
Unlike for lawyers, who are repeat-player litigators, for execu-
tives, litigation tends to be more of a one-shot enterprise with enor-
mous potential risks and consequences that they find difficult to
comprehend and evaluate. A law firm attorney contrasted his per-
spective with that of his clients:
I would say that most clients have a lot more frustration with
the system than I have because, compared to what they do in
the business world, litigation is a lot more risky. rm used to
that. I understand that litigation is risky and that every time I
go into the courtroom, I may be well prepared [to lose]. . . . To
me, if I'm going to try five cases in a year, I understand that in
one of those five I'm probably going to get surprised and rm not
going to get the result that I expect. But for the client, this may
53. Interview with executive 3 (Apr. 15, 1994).
54. Interview with inside counsel 1 (Jan. 22, 1994). This quote reflects findings
similar to those in Professor Stewart Macaulay's classic study of the automobile in-
dustry where businesspeople generally avoided using legal norms and sanctions be-
cause they believed that doing so would threaten ongoing relationships that they
valued. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 A. Soc. REv. 55 (1963). This phenomenon is captured quite nicely in the
following quote:
If something comes up, you get the other man on the telephone and deal with
the problem. You don't read legalistic contract clauses at each other if you
ever want to do business again. One doesn't run to lawyers if he wants to
stay in business because one must behave decently. Id- at 61.
55. Interview with inside counsel 3 (Mar. 9, 1994).
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be the only litigation that they've had in a long period of time
and if it's their one case that goes the other way, this is a disap-
pointment to them. They don't like uncertainty. One of the
things they try to get in their business transactions is more cer-
tainty.... They may be trading stocks and they're willing to
take risks because they're the ones that are judging the risks
and they feel on top of it. And they think, "I'm willing to bet
that something is going to happen in the market because that's
what I do for a living." But in court they're [thinking], "[Am I]
willing to bet [my] 75 percent chance that we're going to win this
case [even though]there is a] 25 percent chance [I'm] going to
lose the company and get a $10 million verdict against [me]?"
... That's a real terrible risk for them and they're totally out of
control, so they hate it. 56
While most executives do not like litigation, most can live with it.
However, some have extremely intense feelings about it, as described
by the same lawyer:
I do have one client in particular that I've dealt with recently
who ... thinks the world is coming to an end primarily because
of product liability lawsuits. He's just on a rampage. [He thinks
that] product liability stuff is going to ruin the country and
every time I talk to him he says, "Well, I'll just close the doors
and leave the key behind. [I'll] just turn over the whole
company."5 7
Though many executives feel that litigation reduces their control
over their affairs, many do not necessarily want to exercise control
over litigation because they would then have to assume responsibility
for the decisions and possibly be assigned blame for unfavorable out-
comes. According to a general counsel:
One of the things that I find here inside our corporation is that
frequently there are a lot of people who would just as soon
[have] the lawyers make all of the decisions, because it saves
[effort] for them to do that. And then there's always somebody
else that they can blame.5 8
Executives may lose face within their organizations not only if
the company loses a suit but also for merely suggesting litigation. In
the words of one executive:
We are so anti-litigation oriented that [executives in my com-
pany who would suggest] that we would commence [litigation
would] be more likely to get their hand slapped if they bring in
56. Interview with outside counsel 4 (Mar. 18, 1994).
57. Id.
58. Interview with inside counsel 4 (Mar. 16, 1994).
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the lawyers, which has happened. . . . A lawsuit is messy and
polarizes people. We slap hands for that because we encourage
people to search for the win-win [solutions] .... Someone who is
happy-go-lucky and throwing around lawsuits-it would proba-
bly work against them, at least in this company.5 9
When a business is involved in litigation, executives are often in
the uneasy role of being formally responsible for making the major
decisions while being pushed in a particular direction by the way the
attorneys frame the choices. As a result, executives often just ratify
decisions that the attorneys have already effectively made, at least in
cases where the legal issues are especially salient.6 0 Here is one of
several accounts describing how this process works:
I think generally, business lawyers will give the business man-
agers the courtesy and the respect of having them make the de-
cision. But I think that's, in many instances, a formality. I
mean if I come in and I tell you, "Look, the odds we're going to
win this case are a toss-up. I mean we're before a California
jury. It should be a $200,000 case, but it's a California jury so it
could be $2 million. Or we can settle it for $300,000." I mean
there's not a businessman in this world who's going to say,
Let's gamble. Let's go for that" and then get stung with $2 mil-
lion. So, yeah, the business guys made the decision but in effect
the lawyer has.6 1
Litigation thus presents executives with few advantages and is
accompanied by a dependence on lawyers, which creates additional
problems for them. Executives typically face the unappealing choice
of getting personally involved with litigation (with its undesirable
risk and reward prospects for them) or accepting the consequences of
leaving the lawyers without adequate supervision. As one general
counsel described:
I think if the lawyer is in control of litigation, there's a great
opportunity-and in fact rve observed consistently-that the
59. Interview with executive 3 (Apr. 15, 1994).
60. When executives feel more confident in their knowledge of the issues, they
may assert more authority in making decisions. For example, executives may be
more assertive in some commercial and employment disputes if they have more confi-
dence in their judgment than in some product liability cases if they do not have as
much confidence about their knowledge about the issues involved. Cf supra text ac-
companying note 56 (executives are uncomfortable taking risks based on assessment
of legal issues even though they are comfortable taking risks in their business
operations).
61. Interview with inside counsel 1 (Jan. 22, 1994).
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litigation can tend to get out of hand. You find that excess dis-
covery is engaged in. There's more argument than is necessary.
Without firm control, the lawyers are left to their own process. 62
Inside counsel reflected a blend of the experience and perspec-
tives of both outside counsel and executives. Like outside counsel,
they had been socialized in the legal profession. They worked closely
with private attorneys and many had been in private practice them-
selves before taking positions as corporate counsel. They understood
how the litigation process works and did not operate under the same
disadvantages as executives in trying to understand and navigate the
court system. For many inside counsel, litigation was a major, if not
the principal, activity in their work. As noted infra in Part V.C, they
generally perceived, unlike executives, that additional litigation may
actually enhance their prestige.
On the other hand, inside counsel were similar to executives in
that they were typically much more familiar with the personnel and
problems within their companies than were outside counsel. More-
over, like the executives, they tended to identify with their companies
and placed disputes in a longer-term perspective of the company's in-
terests in maintaining relationships with suppliers, customers, em-
ployees, and others. Furthermore, while inside counsel may gain
stature from litigation, this is particularly so when they are perceived
as having achieved a practical and timely resolution in the litigation.
Indeed, inside counsel may get the most benefit from narrowly avert-
ing litigation and thus demonstrating their worth to their company.
As one inside counsel stated, "[Top executives] are looking at the bot-
tom line. [Inside counsel are evaluated based on] getting the issues
resolved and what's it costing us in terms of money, reputation, time,
all that sort of thing."63 Thus, unlike for outside counsel, litigation is
not an end in itself for inside counsel. Inside counsel often analyzed
litigation using a similar approach as executives. One executive com-
pared inside and outside counsel this way:
I'm generalizing here and it's perhaps unfair, but I think the
types of attorneys that tend to be on the inside are counsel [who]
are more motivated and know how to get to win-win [results].
Whereas I think the hired gun approach is more adversarial by
its nature. This is cynical, but [outside counsel] oftentimes [are]
looking to take it all the way as opposed to measuring inputs
and outputs and viewing it as just another business decision. 64
62. Interview with inside counsel 3 (Mar. 9, 1994).
63. Interview with inside counsel 4 (Mar. 16, 1994).
64. Interview with executive 3 (Apr. 15, 1994).
[Vol. 3:1
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Such observations suggest that inside counsel may feel caught in
a tension between the perspectives of outside counsel and executives.
As indicated infra in Part V.G, their views about litigation differ
sharply from those of both their organizational superiors and col-
leagues and leaders in their profession.
C. Personal Interest in and Satisfaction with Litigation
Given the differences in the roles that litigation plays in their
professional lives, it is not surprising that the attorneys and execu-
tives had quite different evaluations of their own personal exper-
iences with litigation. The attorneys, especially outside counsel, were
fairly satisfied, whereas the executives were generally very dissatis-
fied with the results in their 'experiences with litigation.Ca Three-
quarters of outside counsel (76%) and more than half of inside coun-
sel (58%) said that they were satisfied, compared with only one quar-
ter of executives (25%). All three groups of respondents were less
satisfied with the process of handling cases in litigation than with the
results. Somewhat more than half of outside counsel (57%) said that
they were satisfied with the process in their litigation experiences,
compared with a third of inside counsel (32%) and one fifth of execu-
tives (20%). For each group in the sample, especially the executives,
satisfaction with litigation process and results are highly correlated
with each other.66 Neither measure of satisfaction is, however, sig-
nificantly correlated with how often respondents' firms or clients
were defendants, as some might expect.
Respondents were also asked to assess the likely personal conse-
quences if their firm or a major client engaged in a substantially in-
creased volume of litigation.67 Respondents were asked about five
65. Executives' reported satisfaction here is considerably less than that reported
in a careful 1982 survey that the Gallup Organization conducted for the Insurance
Information Institute. Gallup surveyed 205 senior executives in Fortune 500 compa-
nies, 204 presidents or owners of small businesses, and 108 risk managers in busi-
nesses other than insurance companies. The respondents were asked about the
satisfaction of business defendants with results of suits that were settled and brought
to trial. They generally believed that businesses were satisfied with settlement re-
sults (percentages of satisfaction ranging from 53% to 67% in the three groups) but
were not satisfied with trial results (percentages of satisfaction ranging from 38 to
44%). GALLUP ORGANIZATION, supra note 20, at 198-99, 209. In the 1984-85 survey of
Chicago residents, of those who had experience in court and knew the results, 50%
said that they were very pleased with the outcome and 25%, said that they were some-
what pleased. See TviER, supra note 48, at 89.
66. For further information about correlations, see note 42, infra.
67. Outside counsel were asked about the consequences for private attorneys of a
substantial increase in the volume of litigation of a major business client of their law
firm. Inside counsel and executives were asked about the consequences for inside
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types of consequences for them (or people like them) 68 of increased
volumes of litigation in their firms: (a) effect on their personal com-
pensation, (b) opportunity for advancement, (c) their relative impor-
tance within their firm ("prestige"), (d) their ability to work
independent of direction of colleagues in other professions ("auton-
omy"), 69 and (e) their ability to do work they find very satisfying. Not
surprisingly, the three types of respondents had very different expec-
tations about these consequences. The executives' ratings differ sig-
nificantly from those of both outside and inside counsel on all five
variables. Inside and outside counsel's ratings differ significantly
from each other regarding compensation, advancement, and prestige,
but not regarding autonomy or opportunity to do satisfying work.
More than 85% of the outside counsel saw increased litigation as
beneficial for their compensation, advancement, and prestige, and
these perceptions are very highly inter-correlated. Given the incen-
tive structure in law firms in which generating new business has be-
come increasingly important,70 this is precisely what one would
expect. Regarding opportunities to do satisfying work, 40% of the
outside counsel saw increased litigation as beneficial with almost half
(46%) expecting no change. Although close to half of the outside
counsel (43%) saw increased litigation as enhancing their autonomy,
counsel and top executives, respectively, of a substantial increase in the volume of
litigation for their firm. In the questions to all respondents, the hypothetical included
the condition of the same variety of suits as before. This was included because in
preliminary interviews some people responding to questions without this qualification
indicated that their responses would depend on whether the additional litigation
would be all the same type and thus more routine.
68. Respondents were asked about their expectations of the probable conse-
quences of increased volume of litigation for "typical" members of the class of respon-
dent that they belonged to (i.e., attorneys in private firms, inside counsel, or top
executives). In preliminary interviews in which respondents were asked about prob-
able effects for them personally, several respondents had difficulty addressing the
question because of what they said were idiosyncratic elements in their organization.
In response to questions about "typical" members of their class of respondent, many
respondents explicitly based their responses on the situation in their own organiza-
tions and many others probably did so implicitly. Thus responses to these questions
are likely to reflect how respondents perceive their own current situations or similar
situations in other firms where they might expect to work in the future.
69. For each group of respondents, the question referred to the position of those
most likely to have formal authority or practical influence over the respondents' activ-
ities. The question for outside counsel referred to autonomy from top executives of
the major business client (whose volume of litigation increased). The question for
inside counsel referred to autonomy from top executives of the firm. The question for
executives referred to autonomy from the firm's lawyers.
70. See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 9, at 52-53.
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almost a third (31%) expected that increased litigation would de-
crease their autonomy, presumably due to increased monitoring and
intervention by their clients. 71 For outside counsel, perceived effects
on autonomy and work satisfaction are modestly correlated with each
other but neither of these variables is significantly correlated with
anticipated effects on compensation, advancement, or prestige.
Almost three quarters of inside counsel (72%) saw increased liti-
gation as increasing their prestige within their firm. Managing legal
disputes is one of their principal tasks. Because litigation can be a
major source of uncertainty and organizations typically value individ-
uals who can manage or reduce uncertainty, it is not surprising that
increased litigation would contribute to the prestige and power of in-
side counsel within their firms.72 Though more than half of the in-
side counsel (53%) did not believe that increased litigation would
have any effect on their opportunities for advancement, almost half
(42%) believed that it would increase such opportunities, perhaps be-
cause it might lead to an increase in the size of the legal department.
Unlike outside counsel, however, inside counsel are not generally
paid based on the volume of litigation work. This presumably ex-
plains why almost two-thirds of the inside counsel (63%) said that
increased litigation would not affect their compensation; nonethe-
less, more than a third (37%) believed that it would result in greater
compensation.
Inside counsel were more divided about whether increased litiga-
tion would affect their autonomy and opportunities to do satisfring
work, and, if so, the direction of the effect. A plurality of inside coun-
sel believed that it would improve their autonomy (40%) and work
satisfaction (45%) compared with 23% who believed it would reduce
their autonomy and 29% who expected it would reduce their work
satisfaction. As with outside counsel, perceived effects on compensa-
tion, advancement, and prestige are highly inter-correlated. For in-
side counsel, perceived effects on advancement and prestige are also
moderately correlated with work satisfaction.
The executives generally perceived few personal benefits from in-
creased litigation. Though some of the executives believed that it
would not affect them personally, many believed that it would hurt
71. Some outside counsel might anticipate that increased litigation would reduce
their autonomy due to a need for a larger legal team and thus increased need for
supervision within the team. This is certainly plausible. If, however, the respondent
anticipated being at the head of such a team, it could result in increased autonomy.
72. See generally David J. Hickson et al., A Strategic Contingencies Theory of In-
traorganizational Power, 16 Armnn. Scm. Q. 216 (1971).
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them, especially in terms of autonomy (70%) and opportunities to do
satisfying work (70%). Much smaller percentages of executives ex-
pected it would decrease their compensation (17%), opportunities for
advancement (30%), or prestige (26%). Almost all five of the five vari-
ables are significantly inter-correlated for executives.
D. Litigation Explosion and Frivolous Lawsuits
Two of the most common criticisms of the civil justice system are
that the system is flooded with frivolous lawsuits and that there has
been a litigation explosion in recent years. Virtually all of the execu-
tives (94%) said that there had been a litigation explosion the past
ten years or so, and almost as many inside counsel (82%) agreed.
Even among the outside counsel, almost half (49%) agreed, compared
with 40% who disagreed.7 3
Respondents were also asked how often lawsuits initiated by in-
dividuals against businesses are so frivolous that they should never
have been filed in court. Almost three quarters of the executives
(70%) thought that more than half of such cases are so frivolous.74
This compares with more than half of the inside counsel (53%) but
only 14% of the outside counsel who characterized these lawsuits in
this way. Surprisingly, only for the outside counsel were perceptions
73. In addition, six percent of the executives, seven percent of the inside counsel,
and twelve percent of the outside counsel said that there had been an increase in
litigation but would not characterize it as an "explosion."
A 1987 survey of 578 lawyers conducted for the American Bar Association found
that 62% of the lawyers believed that there was a litigation explosion then. Paul
Reidinger, The Litigation Boom, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1, 1987, at 37. A 1982 survey of the
general public, senior corporate executives, entrepreneurs in small businesses, and
business risk managers did not ask about a "litigation explosion" but did ask whether
the number of lawsuits had changed in the prior year. All four groups believed that
there had been an increase, including 69% of the public and 72 to 83% of the business
respondents. GALLUP ORGANIZATION, supra note 20, at 14.
Empirical studies of actual litigation trends are at odds the perception of a gener-
alized litigation explosion. With respect to many types of cases, the litigation rates
have been relatively level. Sharp increases in litigation rates have occurred in partic-
ular types of cases such as family law, criminal, and certain types of product liability
cases. A large proportion of the product liability cases deal with a relatively small
number of products and businesses. See Galanter, supra note 18, at 1102-09.
74. More executives seem to have become concerned about frivolous suits in re-
cent years. In the 1982 Gallup survey, only 37 to 43% of the three groups of business
respondents (as well as 31% of the general public) said that plaintiffs have a justified
cause for bringing suit in less than half the cases. GALLUP ORGANIZATION, supra note
20, at 17. Because of the reversal in the wording of this question, these figures are
comparable to the 70% of executives in my survey who believe that more than half of
cases are frivolous. The question in my survey specifically asked about suits by indi-
viduals against businesses, which may account for some or all of the difference be-
tween the two survey results.
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of a litigation explosion significantly correlated with proportion of
frivolous suits. Many of the respondents recited, with gusto, cases
that they had heard of that they felt were outrageous, 75 such as the
following:
There was a person who had some sort of gallbladder sur-
gery.... The surgeon, by mistake, cut part of her bladder. So
they just sewed her up with a smaller bladder.... [I1f the nor-
mal person pees five times a day, she had to do it ten times a
day. She got $11 million. They could do a lot of things to me for
$11 million. Come on, is this right? Was she right with the law
and that some injustice that happened to her? Of course. But
the idea had got fanned into such a big deal that the jury went
crazy and the judge wasn't going to stop it. 76
There was a case in which a boy was riding a bicycle with a
helmet on and had an accident. And they came back and they
awarded the child $8 million. The suit was based on the fact
that the bicycle manufacturer didn't tell the kid that he needed
to have a light on his bike when he rode at night.77
A young girl's mother and dad sue a school board in Texas for
the right to play football on the boy's football team. They pre-
vail. The girl is injured. Then her parents sue the school board
for failing to protect her ... and she prevails. I think that's an
unfair result. There's a lot of those kinds of cases.78
For many of the respondents, the mere fact that the suit was
filed is a moral affront, regardless of the outcome.79 This is illus-
trated by the following colloquy with the general counsel of a food
company:
75. Hayden described several "horror stories" that were widely publicized in the
mass media. Journalistic investigations revealed that the horror stories were mis-
leading but these rarely achieve the level of notoriety of the horror stories themselves.
Hayden, supra note 17, at 104-08. Perhaps the most famous contemporary legal hor-
ror story is about the woman who won a $3 million award against McDonald's because
she was burned when she put a coffee cup in her lap. Most people are probably not
aware that "McDonald's knew the danger of selling coffee [fifteen to twenty degrees
hotter than its competitors]-it had received 700 complaints in the previous five
years, some involving serious burns-but it never considered changing its practice."
Moreover, few people probably know that the plaintiff originally demanded only
$2000 or that the trial judge reduced the total award to $640,000. Gross & Syverud,
supra note 11, at 5, 7.
76. Interview with inside counsel 2 (Mar. 2, 1994).
77. Interview with executive 2 (Apr. 8, 1994).
78. Interview with outside counsel 3 (Mar. 23, 1994).
79. Cf David M. Engel, The Oven Bird's Song: Insiders, Outsiders, and Personal
Injuries in an American Community, 18 L. & Soc'y Rv. 551, 574-77 (1984) (members
of the public disapproved of filing tort suits which were seen as "intrusions upon ex-
isting relationships, as pretexts for forced exchanges, as inappropriate attempts to
redistribute wealth, and as limitations upon individual freedom").
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[There] are the little ticky-tacky [lawsuits] and you'd be sur-
prised at how many civil cases you can have. People sue for re-
ally crazy things. ....
Question: What happens in those silly cases?
Well, usually it gets dismissed fairly quickly. I'm talking
about really silly ones. We had one . . .where the top ten or
fifteen food companies were being sued by an individual out in
California, of course. This individual was suing them because
on the food packages, they had a little "K" for kosher and he said
it was infringing on his freedom of religion because it was trying
to make him Jewish by eating the food. This was a lawsuit!
This was a lawsuit that was filed!
Question: And what happened to it?
Oh, it was dismissed immediately. It was filed! This whole
thing went on, the [plaintiffs] lawyer saying, "[It's] not me. I'm
just representing them." [So I said,] "Come on. Why are you
even doing it?"s °
Even some lawyers who believed that popular stories about frivo-
lous suits exaggerate the extent of the problem believe that they can
cause serious difficulties even if they are eventually rejected by the
courts:
I think there are a lot fewer frivolous cases than folklore among
business people would have it. ... [Y]ou hear the horror stories
of a frivolous case and the plaintiff got $2 million. I bet that
hasn't happened very often. If it was so frivolous, they wouldn't
have gotten $2 million.
There are frivolous cases that are filed and when that hap-
pens, it is sometimes expensive to get rid of them. Your chances
of actually getting attorney's fees are not that good, particularly
if you represent a fairly good-sized business. It's some poor
plaintiff that [does not have a] very good lawyer and they really
are off the deep end in filing their complaint. I think most
judges are going to say, "I may dismiss the case, I'll give you
summary judgment, but I'm not going to assess attorney's fees.
It's not the plaintiffs fault. They went to some lawyer that was
the best they could afford [who] wasn't very good. I know Joe
Schmoe. He's in here all the time. He's struggling. He doesn't
have much of a practice. You guys ran up $40,000 worth of legal
fees."... And so from the businessperson's standpoint it's, "I got
sued. It was a bullshit lawsuit. My lawyer spent $40,000 get-
ting rid of it and we couldn't get any attorney's fees from the
other side. What a travesty!"8 '
80. Interview with inside counsel 2 (Mar. 2, 1994).
81. Interview with outside counsel 4 (Mar. 18, 1994).
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E. Integrity of the Search for Truth and Fairness
This Part analyzes respondents' confidence in litigation's ability
to produce fair outcomes based on the truth.8 2 Consistent with the
preceding findings, the attorneys generally had more faith in the in-
tegrity of the litigation process than did the executives. The attor-
neys had generally favorable assessments of the fairness of outcomes
in lawsuits unlike most of the executives in this study. A majority of
the outside counsel (70%) and inside counsel (54%) viewed court re-
sults as being fair more than half the time compared with less than a
third of the executives (30%) who believed that.8 3
In response to a related question, most respondents said that the
legal system is not a good mechanism for finding the truth. Forty
percent of outside counsel believed that the legal system correctly de-
termines the truth more than half the time, compared with 38% of
inside counsel and 28% of executives, suggesting little confidence in
this aspect of the justice system.14 Indeed, many respondents
laughed cynically when the proposition was posed to them.8s The
82. A principal function of litigation is to produce appropriately reasoned resolu-
tions of disputes. See supra text accompanying note 2 (Resnik's justification for adju-
dication as producing outcomes superior to those produced with little or no process). I
use the term "integrity" to refer to the degree to which litigation is perceived to pro-
duce such outcomes.
83. The views of the Chicago residents in the 1984-85 survey were most similar
to those of the inside counsel's views, as 56-59% agreed or strongly agreed that court
decisions in Chicago are almost always fair, compared with 41-44% who disagreed or
strongly disagreed. TYLER, supra note 48, at 49.
84. Several reviewers noted that finding the truth correctly at least half the time
is a fairly low standard for evaluating the ability to find the truth in litigation. One
reviewer characterized the respondents' views as "not merely an indictment (of the
system]; it is a hanging charge." It is tempting to compare the standard of finding the
truth at least half the time with the results of a coin toss where one vill get a particu-
lar result 50% of the time simply by chance. Of course, determining "the truth7 in
contested lawsuits is much more complicated than determining the result of a coin
toss. Moreover, litigation usually involves making multiple determinations. If vindi-
cation of the truth of one's perspective is important, individuals may well focus more
on instances where the court erred about the facts than when the court made (what
they believe to be) correct determinations. For example, if there are five facts to be
adjudicated, partisans may feel that the court did not find the truth if they believe
that even one of the five determinations was erroneous. Considering the coin toss
analogy, the probability of correctly calling a set of five tosses is substantially less
than 50%. I suspect, however, that most people would not make such distinctions in
daily life when determining whether the court "got it right." Thus these survey find-
ings suggest a considerable lack of confidence in this feature of litigation, even among
the outside counsel.
85. This is similar to Resnik's experiences in casual conversations that descrip-
tion of cross-examination as the "greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery
of truth" often generated chuckles. See supra text accompanying note 2.
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lawyers, especially the outside counsel, seemed to think that the liti-
gation process is imperfect but somehow muddles through to produce
the right result in many cases even if it is not based on an accurate
determination of the facts. This may be due, in part, to the premise
that an adversary system is intended to guarantee opportunities to
make one's case and that if parties have been given their procedural
rights, the results are presumably correct by definition.8 6 The execu-
tives obviously had less confidence in both the truth-finding process
itself and the fairness of the results, perhaps because, unlike the
legal culture, their professional culture is not based on the premises
of an adversarial legal system. For all three groups of respondents,
confidence in the truth-finding process and the fairness of the results
are significantly correlated.8 7
In the in-depth interviews, many respondents, especially the
lawyers, expressed confidence in the fairness of court results gener-
ally. For example, one general counsel said:
Courts are fairly fair. They're fairly predictable. If you read the
law, if you look at the issues before the court, you generally
know what is going to happen. There are cases that are 51/49
that's right on the line, but they're the rare cases. Most of the
cases are 70/30. Pretty much it's going to be your win unless
you really blow it here. Or you're going to lose this one and you
really ought to be dealing with it.88
Supporters of the court system typically qualified their support,
however, indicating that it generally works fairly well but noting var-
ious exceptions. Here an outside counsel argued that the courts are
basically working properly and he attributed the problems that do
exist to a minority of litigants and attorneys who are selfish and
uncooperative:
86. See supra note 11 (arguing that the essence of adversarial litigation is proce-
dure and thus justice is defined in procedural terms).
87. It is interesting to compare this limited confidence in the operation of litiga-
tion with a greater confidence in the system of law as a means of ordering relations.
The vast majority of all respondents agreed that legal rules and precedents provide
useful guidelines for structuring business relations. This included not only 90% of
outside counsel and 77% of inside counsel but also 65% of executives. Moreover, ap-
proximately 60% of all three types of respondents agreed that "the courts help re-
strain inappropriate business practices," suggesting some faith in the value of
litigation generally to maintain commercial norms. Unfortunately, the ambiguous
wording of the question makes it difficult to separate a faith in a deterrent role of
litigation in general from a faith in actual enforcement of business norms in specific
cases. Given the pattern of responses to the other questions, I suspect that the execu-
tives probably have greater faith in the general deterrent role and the attorneys have
more confidence in both roles of litigation.
88. Interview with inside counsel 2 (Mar. 2, 1994).
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The court system, I think, is working fine.... When I go in to
try a case, the judges do a good job. Things are fairly timely and
so on and so forth. When you get involved in one of these
Superfimd cases where you've got 100 parties and bunches of
lawyers and all that, I don't know how much it's the responsibil-
ity of the judge or the court system to try to iron all those things
out. ... Because ultimately, the judge cannot take away from
someone the right to have all the due process and go through all
the procedure. ... What I find frustrating is that it somehow is
very difficult for people to come to a conclusion ... that it doesn't
make economic sense for [them] to exercise all [their] rights to
the fullest. . . . Part of the problem [is that] it only takes a
couple of stinkers to say, "We're going to take advantage of that.
We know that you're willing to give up some of your rights.
We're going to say that we're not willing to give up any of ours
and as a result we're going to get a little bit better deal." And
then everybody says, "Well gee, if they're going to be an S.O.B.
about it, I don't-" It just all falls apart then.8 9
Many supporters of the court system qualified their otherwise
favorable view because of concerns about the time and expense of liti-
gation.90 For example, one lawyer said, "I may be old-fashioned in
this way, but litigation is a good dispute resolution mechanism too.
It's a shame that it's so hard to get to. But there are lots of disputes
where litigation is quite right with the result."9 ' Another example of
this perspective is from the attorney who said that the courts are
"fairly fair" and predictable. When I asked how well he thought the
court system had been working in the past ten years or so, I noted for
the record that he rolled his eyes, suggesting something between dis-
belief and disgust. He responded:
Rolled his eyes and laughed! I mean, the system is
overburdened. It's in rough shape. You get justice but it takes
so long, maybe the justice isn't worth it. The civil system is in
bad shape. The criminal system is in worse [shape]. Given the
justice systems rve seen outside the U.S., we have a phenome-
nal system [here]. We have very capable people; the judges are
sharp cookies. You can always get a bad apple but these are
intelligent people, dedicated and all of that stuff. But intelligent
and dedicated are useless if you're overburdened. ... I mean if
you had enough courtrooms and you had enough judges and you
had enough jails, ... the system could actually run smoothly
89. Interview with outside counsel 4 (Mar. 18, 1994).
90. Opinions about the time and expense involved in litigation are discussed fur-
ther infra Part V.F.
91. Interview with outside counsel 1 (Mar. 17, 1994).
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and people could actually get a speedy resolution of rights.
Then I think the system could work. But it ain't working and
it's getting worse and people are terrified of it.
9 2
Yet another reason why lawyers and executives reacted nega-
tively to litigation is that they believed that it is not framed in terms
of their substantive concerns, which they think are often too complex
for the courts. This view was expressed by a utility company
executive:
Judges are trained in the law, not necessarily in the fundamen-
tals of a particular industry or avenue of commerce. They're
coached on fairness and precedent and things like that.... For
example, we have a number of disputes with people who we
transact with in a transmission grid. Well, that's a very com-
plex engineering-econometric type consideration where we use
those mechanisms. It's just not the type of thing you want to
bring to the courts.9 3
While a few respondents expressed unqualified support for litiga-
tion, quite a number of lawyers and executives expressed unqualified
criticism, such as the following statement from a corporate counsel:
I started out as a plaintiffs trial attorney with a strong belief in
the jury system and a strong belief that, while it had its flaws, it
was the best we had to offer. I don't believe that anymore. I
think the system is broken. I think it behooves you to do any-
thing possible to avoid it. I find it hard to find any area in which
the civil justice or criminal justice system works anymore ...
You can go through all of the different systems, whether it be
family law, through divorce, products claims, malpractice
claims, securities litigation, you know, virtually every category
of major litigation. And you look at it then in terms of some
kind of a set of objective criteria that you would apply against
any kind of a dispute resolution process. Is it predictable, relia-
ble in terms of a rule? Are the transaction costs reasonable in
terms of a result? Does it provide guidance then for the future?
Not a single one of these systems would even get a passing
grade. I mean all of them-to a one-are abject failures. 94
F. Jury Decisions and Perceived Bias Against Business
Several survey questions about jury decisions helped to clarify
the respondents' perceptions about the integrity of the litigation pro-
cess, particularly in cases involving businesses. These questions are
92. Interview with inside counsel 2 (Mar. 2, 1994).
93. Interview with executive 3 (Apr. 15, 1994).
94. Interview with inside counsel 1 (Jan. 22, 1994).
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especially interesting in light of public criticism regarding the role of
juries and claims that the jury system is responsible for problems in
the legal system and society more generally.95 As with the preceding
items, outside counsel were generally most sympathetic to litigation
and the executives were least sympathetic.
One question asked respondents' opinions about how often juries
do a good job in determining liability in lawsuits by individuals
against businesses. More than half of the executives (58%) and al-
most that proportion of inside counsel (46%) said that juries do a good
job in less than half these cases, compared with only 12% of the
outside counsel. All three groups of respondents had less confidence
in juries' abilities to determine damages than liability. About three
quarters of the executives (82%) and inside counsel (74%) thought
that juries do a good job in assessing damages in less than half the
cases, compared with 44% of the outside counsel. 96
Despite the different assessments of the two types of jury deci-
sions-damages and liability-respondents' opinions about them are
highly correlated for all three groups. One attorney illustrated this
contrast of opinion about the two types of jury decisions: "There may
be product liability situations or civil rights situations where this
plaintiff should win. I think as those go, all that's O.K. The size of
the award [is where] the jury has gone nuts."97 Another attorney ex-
pressed a similar frustration with juries' decision-making about
damages:
[Jurors will] focus on something that is more akin to "L A Law"
than is true in a courtroom context because that's what they've
been schooled in terms of what a courtroom is. And in terms of
monetary judgments and awards, they liken the numbers they
see there to the lottery numbers. And I don't know if anyone
has done a statistical study, but I think that the sheer [number
95. See Galanter, supra note 18, at 1095-98.
96. The 1982 Gallup survey also indicated widespread lack of confidence injuries'
decisions about damages. Sixty-five to 77% of the business respondents (and 57% of
the general public) thought that judges rather than juries should determine the
amount of damages when a defendant is liable. GALLUP ORGANZATION, supra notes
20, 65, at 29. Moreover, 61 to 72% of the business respondents (and 40% of the gen-
eral public) believed that the amount of damages awarded in civil suits is too high.
Id. at 32.
Reviewing social science research on jury behavior, Galanter concluded that
while "critics claim that jury verdicts are irresponsible and capricious, serious stu-
dents of the jury are virtually unanimous in their high regard for the jury as a deci-
sion-maker." Galanter, supra note 18, at 1109-15.
97. Interview with inside counsel 2 (Mar. 2, 1994); see also supra text accompany-
ing note 76 (account of a suit where respondent agreed with the decision on liability
but not damages).
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of] zeros that come up in lotteries make it no longer [unusual]
for a jury to talk about $5 million, $10 million, $100 million,
maybe a billion dollars in some of their judgments. And [they]
do it without any relationship to what the damage was.98
Many of the comments about juries focused on the capabilities of
the jurors to make decisions. One general counsel expressed the view
that juries' good judgment is often outweighed by emotion, saying,
"Oh, a plaintiffs lawyer can get [jurors] all riled up on emotion. It's
got nothing to do with the law. It's got nothing to do with real liabil-
ity. It's got nothing to do with real facts. It's got to do with who's the
better actor."99
Several executives explained their views that businesses should
and do try to avoid jury trials because issues are too complex for ju-
rors to handle.
Is it any surprise that many commercial contracts these days
have a clause where each party waives its right to a trial by
jury? Doesn't that tell you something? That they are not willing
to trust twelve peers off the street with the complexity of their
business transaction. .. .And that doesn't mean that people are
stupid. It means that businesses have become very complex in
many respects. The nature of their product offerings, not neces-
sarily how the business is run, but the nature of the products.
Open up the insides of a laptop computer and try to have some
jury decide whether or not there has been a patent infringement
on the design of a microchip. I certainly wouldn't be capable of
doing that. 00
Responses to several questions revealed that respondents gener-
ally thought that litigation is not congenial for businesses. About
three-quarters of the executives (75%) and inside counsel (73%) be-
lieved that juries judge businesses more harshly than juries judge
individuals. Three fifths of the outside counsel (60%) shared this
view. 1 1 On a similar point, respondents generally believed that the
courts are not very sensitive to businesses' concerns. About two-
thirds of all three types of respondents disagreed with the statement
that "the legal system generally considers the needs and practices of
98. Interview with inside counsel 1 (Jan. 22, 1994).
99. Interview with inside counsel 2 (Mar. 2, 1994).
100. Interview with executive 3 (Apr. 15, 1994).
101. But see Valerie P. Hans & William S. Lofquist, Jurors' Judgments of Business
Liability in Tort Cases: Implications for the Litigation Explosion Debate, 26 L. & Soc'Y
REv. 85, 94-104 (1992) (study of jurors in cases involving businesses found that most
jurors were skeptical of plaintiffs' claims and did not generally believe that businesses
should be held to a higher standard than individuals).
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particular business communities." This includes 67% of executives,
68% of inside counsel, and 61% of outside counsel. Not surprisingly,
the vast majority of respondents believed that "lawsuits involving a
business divert economic resources from more productive activities."
Almost all of the executives (92%) and inside counsel (91%) agreed
with that statement as did 76% of the outside counsel.' 0 2 This dis-
trust of litigation and juries in particular is reflected in the following
relatively sober explanation of an apparent jury bias against
businesses:
I think jurors are sometimes willing to do justice... because
they just view this rule... as one that kind of comes up with a
harsh result in this case. And those are the cases that maybe
will go to a jury more often than not because a plaintiffs lawyer
knows that and [thinks], "God, if I get by this motion for sum-
mary judgment and get to a jury, I've got a real chance because
that argument about, 'Well the law says X is just not going to be
real persuasive to most folks on the jury."103
G. Time and Expense of Litigation
Criticism of the time and expense of litigation is commonplace in
our society. In a recent response to this concern, the federal govern-
ment enacted the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990104 which required
federal courts to develop "civil justice expense and delay reduction
plans." 0 5 Concerns about time and expense might be especially sali-
ent for businesses as time and expenses incurred in litigation could
have substantial effects on profitability. Because criticisms of the
time and expense of litigation are so common and sometimes not
carefully considered, the questions in the survey were prefaced with
the phrase "considering realistically how much [or long] you think
that lawsuits should cost [or take]." Nonetheless, the responses by
all three groups were extremely critical of litigation. Virtually all of
the executives (96%) and inside counsel (91%) and almost two-thirds
of the outside counsel (64%) said that less than half of suits involving
102. The views in this survey are even more negative than in a 1993 survey of 815
members of the general public in which three-quarters believed that the amount of
litigation was hampering the nation's recovery. Randall Samborn, Anti-Lauyer Atti-
tude Up, NAfL L.J., Aug. 9, 1993, at 1. The fact that "only" three-quarters of the
public expressed this view compared with 92% of executives in my survey may be due
to the fact that the National Law Journal survey focused specifically on the nation's
recovery rather than the economy in general.
103. Interview with outside counsel 4 (Mar. 18, 1994).
104. 101 Pub. L. No. 650; 104 Stat. 5089 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1997)).
105. 28 U.S.C. § 471 (1997).
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a business are resolved at an appropriate cost. Judgments about the
time involved in litigation were only slightly better. Eighty-six per-
cent of the executives, 79% of the inside counsel and 63% of the
outside counsel said that less than half of suits involving a business
are resolved within an appropriate amount of time. 106 Judgments
about litigation time and costs are highly correlated with each other
for all three types of respondents.
An executive gave the following account of how litigation costs
can seem to snowball out of control as part of routine practice and as
a result of lawyers' interests in perpetuating litigation to increase
their fees:
How do I collect from someone that isn't paying me? My routine
is very simple. I write threatening letters .... Next, if that
doesn't do it, I have my lawyer write the same kind of threaten-
ing letter on his letterhead, saying in no uncertain terms that if
you do not.., settle this account, we will do the following. Well
what else can you do if the guy doesn't do it? You then have to
file suit. And really there's no quick way of saying, "Let's go
right now into arbitration." The guy gets a... subpoena and...
his lawyer answers the subpoena. ... We've started to shell out
money already. And nobody has stopped the clock and said,
"Wait. How much is this going to cost me before I file this and
he files that and now we go into discovery?". . . Before you know
it, it starts to get expensive. I don't think that there's any great
incentive for the legal system [to keep the costs low], with all
due respect to my friends who are lawyers. 10 7
A general counsel who had previously been in private practice
explained that the delay and expense of litigation was due, at least in
part, to attorneys' concerns about ethical duties and potential mal-
practice liability.
[Attorneys'] professional standards and what they were trying
to accomplish may not be aligned with what's really in the best
interest of the business. ... The outside counsel also has to take
106. These opinions are comparable to the 1982 Gallup survey in which 78 to 89%
of the business respondents (and 67% of the general public) said that there are consid-
erable delays in bringing lawsuits to trial (as opposed to only moderate, slight, or no
delays). GALLUP ORGANIZATION, supra note 20, at 33. A 1994 survey of California
lawyers found that 71% believed that funding for the courts will decline relative to
court workloads and 89% believed that criminal cases will require an increasing share
of court time and resources. DEBORAH R. HENSLER & MARISA E. REDDY, CALIFORNIA
LAWYERS VIEW THE FUTURE: A REPORT TO THE COMMUSSION ON THE FUTURE OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE STATE BAR 8 (1994). Obviously both of these trends would
reduce court resources available for civil cases and could slow the civil litigation
process.
107. Interview with executive 4 (Apr. 7, 1994).
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into consideration... "Are you following the code of ethics in
terms of what you have to do? Are you covering yourself in the
potential malpractice claim? If you forego doing certain
things-unless it's real clear that your client understands ex-
actly what it is that you're not doing and why-are you going to
end up in a situation that if the outcome is not good, they're
going to turn around and sue you for malpractice?" You've got
that kind of attention too and I think those types of cases have
certainly increased very significantly in the last number of
years. 0 8
Others attribute delay and expense to attorneys' sloppy litigation
practices. Here a veteran inside counsel described what he saw as
dysfumctions of litigation and how plaintiffs' attorneys contributed to
the problems:
In a substantial number of cases, people who are not in the elite
plaintiffs counsel hierarchy often don't prepare their case until
they absolutely have to. So what they do is file a suit to beat the
statute of limitations, they don't work it, they send out form in-
terrogatories, and so forth. They take depositions willy-nilly
and even those they don't take for a substantial period of time.
The plaintiffs themselves are sitting there-one, two, three, four
years pass. Finally you end up at the courthouse steps with
substantial money having been sunk into it and the plaintiffs
attorney, by that time, realizes what they've got and they settle.
So you've all just wasted a tremendous amount of money that
could have gone to compensate the plaintiff in the first place.
... When we look at the costs of our litigation in the products
[liability] area, two-thirds of it goes for discovery. Ninety-five
percent of the material generated in discovery is never used at
trial. So its an incredible waste. People will say that within the
first six weeks of having a case, you know probably 80-90% of
what youll ever know about that case on both sides.' 0 9
This attorney was no more charitable in describing what he saw
as the defense bar's generating an expensive process that seems out
of control:
I think part of the problem is the defense bar or the "litigators."
I think that a] tremendous [segment] of the litigation fraternity
[are] people who have never tried a lawsuit. Their training and
their sole practice is generating this huge mass of discovery.
You get this team together and they get focused on "a case" and
108. Interview with inside counsel 4 (Mar. 16, 1994).
109. Interview with inside counsel 1 (Jan. 22, 1994).
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they just start the processes. It's no longer, in some cases, doz-
ens of depositions. It's hundreds of depositions. You can do
what you can to try to control it, but it's extraordinarily difficult
to control. You've invested these incredible sums of money and
the person who can make the decision to settle it is being fed a
description of the case that may not be totally accurate because,
in part, some of the people who are working it up aren't exper-
ienced or skilled enough in the actual trial of the lawsuit to
know whether the case is winnable and what the odds are.110
H. Perception of Leaders' Opinions
Peoples' opinions are often affected by the perceived opinions of
others who play an important role in their lives. This Part analyzes
what respondents think that authorities in their professional lives
believe about litigation. It focuses on perceived opinions of top execu-
tives, organizational superiors, and leaders in the respondents'
professions.
In the corporate context, top executives are often seen as the ulti-
mate authorities to be satisfied. Thus their views may be taken as an
important indicator of value in the corporate world. Given the high
value placed on obtaining successful results in both business and liti-
gation, top executives' views on litigation outcomes may be especially
influential. Respondents in this study were asked their opinion about
how often top executives are satisfied with results of litigation involv-
ing a business. All three groups believed that top executives are
more often dissatisfied than they are satisfied. This perception was
especially prevalent among the executives in this study. Sixty-three
percent of the respondents who were executives believed that top ex-
ecutives were satisfied in less than half the cases, compared with 42%
of inside counsel and 47% of outside counsel. By contrast, only 10% of
the respondents who were executives believed that top executives are
satisfied in more than half the cases, compared with 28% of the inside
counsel and 30% of the outside counsel.
Survey respondents were asked a somewhat similar question
about perceived opinions of their "organizational superiors" about lit-
igation. Unlike the preceding question, this one focused on the class
of people that each respondent identified as having the greatest influ-
ence in their current position. 11 Moreover, instead of asking specifi-
cally about satisfaction with results of business litigation, this
question asked about the superiors' general evaluations of how well
110. Id.
111. For a definition of the term "organizational superior," see supra Part WV.A.
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the court system has been working in the past ten years; these ques-
tions used the same wording as in the question about the respon-
dents' own views, as described in Part V.A. Most respondents
believed that their organizational superiors take a dim view of the
traditional litigation process. More than half of the outside counsel
(54%), two-thirds of executives (67%), and five out of six inside coun-
sel (84%) believed that their organizational superiors think that the
court system has been working poorly. The majority of each group of
respondents had more faith in litigation than they believed their
superiors did. This was especially true for inside counsel (77%), but
it was also the case with outside counsel (59%) and executives
(51%).112 Thus, relative to their perceptions of their superiors' views,
many respondents-particularly inside counsel-saw their own
views of litigation as relatively moderate.
As professionals, respondents' opinions may be affected by the
perceived opinions of leaders in their profession. About two-thirds of
both the outside counsel (62%) and inside counsel (67%) believed that
leaders of the bar think that the courts are working well. Roughly
the same percentage of executives (70%) said that they think that the
leaders of their profession think that the courts are working poorly.
In general, respondents believed that their professional leaders had
more extreme opinions than the respondents did themselves. In
other words, executives generally had more faith in litigation than
they believed their professional leaders do, whereas outside counsel
and especially inside counsel generally had less faith in litigation
than they believed bar leaders do. Forty-two percent of the execu-
tives gave higher overall ratings of litigation than they believed their
professional leaders would and only 24% gave lower overall ratings
than they believed their professional leaders would. Forty-five per-
cent of outside counsel gave ratings of litigation lower than perceived
bar leaders' ratings, compared with 20% who gave ratings higher
than perceived bar leaders' ratings. The gap is even larger for inside
counsel: Fifty-four percent of inside counsel gave ratings of litigation
lower than perceived bar leaders' ratings, compared with 19% who
gave ratings higher than perceived bar leaders' ratings.
These patterns suggest that many respondents may experience a
tension between the pressures from their organization and their pro-
fession. This tension seems especially pronounced for inside counsel
112. One inside counsel who sharply criticized the litigation process characterized
the opinions of top managers in his firm in this way- They would express to you views
much stronger in the negative than mine." Interview with inside counsel 3 (Mar. 9,
1994).
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who often believed that their bosses disliked if not detested litigation
while their professional leaders thought that litigation was generally
working quite nicely. Inside counsel themselves did not think that
litigation was quite as bad as they believed their superiors did, nor
did they think it quite as good as did the leaders of their profession.
Their perceptions of the negative opinions of top executives may be
best evidenced by the fact that many respondents (of all types)
laughed when asked about executives' opinions about litigation. 113
Some inside counsel also felt estranged from bar leaders as reflected
by one general counsel who stated, "I see no recognition of a need to
change [the litigation system] ... by the bar or by the judiciary sys-
tem. I think the bar generally feels that it's a major concession if
they admit that there might be something wrong with it."114
VI. CORRELATES OF FAITH IN LITIGATION
Part V shows that opinions of business lawyers and executives
about litigation generally ranged from moderately positive to ex-
tremely negative. Outside counsel tended to be the most positive, ex-
ecutives the most negative, and inside counsel fell in between. This
Part analyzes how the factors discussed in Part V are (or are not)
related to the respondents' overall faith in litigation. 115 The patterns
113. Some respondents also joked about using negative numbers in response to
these questions.
114. Interview with inside counsel 1 (Jan. 22, 1994).
115. Ideally, one would hope that a survey like this would provide strong evidence
about what 'causes" people to hold the opinions they do about litigation. This study
does provide evidence that is quite suggestive but it is not sufficient to support strong
claims of causation for several reasons. One of the basic elements for establishing
causality is called causal order; in other words, for X to cause Y, X must precede Y in
time. When considering discrete events, this is usually not problematic. For exam-
ple, if someone is in an automobile collision and sustains serious injuries, it is gener-
ally possible to determine whether the injuries preceded the collision. By contrast,
the process of opinion formation probably is often an iterative process involving recip-
rocal causation, i.e., various opinions (or perceptions or other cognitive states) may
influence each other. If that is the case, correlations between opinions may be good,
though not conclusive, evidence of such a causal process.
Even when causal order is not problematic, correlations in themselves do not
prove causation because the correlations may be "spurious." An association is spuri-
ous when the two associated events are both caused by the same prior cause. For
example, there may a correlation between the volume of swimsuit sales and number
of drowning deaths but this would not prove that the sales caused the deaths or vice
versa; presumably they are both caused in part by the amount of swimming associ-
ated with the swimming season. For further discussion of causal inference in this
study, see Lande, Ideology of Disputing, supra note 7, at 59-64.
Where there are multiple related variables, one might use multiple regression
statistics rather than correlations to analyze relationships between variables because
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of correlations differ greatly among the three types of respondents, as
summarized in Part VII.
Opinions about how well the court system has been working
overall ("faith in litigation") 61 were not significantly related to most
of the variables describing respondents' organizational settings and
amounts of professional and disputing experience discussed in Part
IV (see Tables 2 and 3). Moreover, in the relatively few instances
where there is a significant correlation, 117 the relationships were
fairly weak and are significant for only one type of respondent. For
outside counsel, faith in litigation is related to length of their profes-
sional experience and the size of their firms. Older attorneys, who
had been practicing law for longer periods in their careers and in
their current firms (variables which were all correlated with each
other) had less favorable opinions about litigation than younger at-
torneys with less experience. In addition, attorneys in larger firms
(i.e., firms with more attorneys and more offices) had more favorable
opinions than attorneys in smaller firms. Outside counsel who had
more experience as partisans in ADR (presumably as advocates) had
less favorable opinions about litigation." 8 Among inside counsel,
faith in litigation was related to the percentage of their careers in
which they focused primarily on litigation. Inside counsel who had
greater percentages of their careers devoted to litigation had more
regression analysis can separate relationships by statistically holding all other vari-
ables constant in a given analysis. See N=ER ET" AL., supra note 37, at 669-70. This
Article presents correlation rather than regression analysis for ease of presentation
and interpretation. Moreover, given that most of the significant relationships involve
opinions and determining causal order between multiple opinions is problematic for
the reasons described above, it is especially difficult to separate the "effects" of multi-
ple opinion variables. I developed regression models for these variables and, as one
would expect, the results are generally consistent with the correlation statistics
presented in this Article. See John Lande, Regression Analysis (1996) (unpublished
manuscript on file with the author). Discrepancies between the two types of analysis
are noted below as appropriate.
116. See supra Part VA
117. For discussion of correlations, see supra, note 42. For discussion ofstatistical
significance, see supra note 37. Note that the statistical significance of correlations is
in part a function of sample size; a given correlation coefficient is more significant in
a larger sample than a smaller sample. Thus because the sample of outside counsel is
larger than the samples of inside counsel and executives in this study, a particular
correlation coefficient in Tables 2-7 may be statistically significant at a given level for
one group but not others.
118. This may be an example of reciprocal causation similar to that described in
supra note 115. Frustration with litigation may have prompted some attorneys to
explore ADR alternatives, and experience with ADR (however caused) may have led
to negative comparative judgments about litigation.
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favorable opinions about litigation than those with smaller propor-
tions of their careers in litigation. Executives' faith in litigation was
related to the number of cases in which they were parties-the more
cases in which they were parties, the less they liked litigation. 119
TABLE 2. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN FAITH IN LITIGATION AND
PERSONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
Outside Inside
Variable Counsel Counsel Executives
Age -. 30** -. 19 .04
Length of professional career -. 31"* -. 17 .12
Tenure with current firm -. 23* -. 13 .00
Number of employees in firm . .14 .13
Number of attorneys in law firm .27* -
Number of cities with law firm offices .29* -
Percentage of clients that are businesses .08 .- -
Percentage of business clients with more than -. 12 .- -
$1 million in annual sales
*p < .05 ** p <.01
TABLE 3. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN FAITH IN LITIGATION AND
EXPERIENCE WITH LITIGATION AND ADR
Outside Inside
Variable Counsel Counsel Executives
Percentage of career in which at least half of -. 18 .28*
time was devoted to litigation
Percentage of time in prior 12 months devoted -. 05 .20
to litigation
Number of cases as witness or juror .- .- .12
Number of cases as party .- .- -. 30*
Number of cases as decision maker .- .- .02
Percentage of cases as defendant -. 07 .08 -. 07
Number of cases as neutral in ADR -. 10 -. 03 .00
Number of cases as partisan in ADR -. 26* .03 -. 05
* p < .05
119. The inverse relationship between the amount of executives' experience with
the courts and their faith in litigation is similar to the pattern found in a survey of the
public in California where people who had been litigants had less favorable opinions
of the courts than people who had never been litigants. See Ellers, supra note 48, at
2190.
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As Table 4 shows, the correlations between satisfaction with liti-
gation results and faith in litigation vary sharply by type of respon-
dent. For outside counsel (who gave relatively high ratings on both
variables) there was no significant correlation. 120 For inside counsel
(who gave intermediate ratings on both variables) there was a moder-
ate correlation.121 For executives, the group giving the lowest ratings
on both variables, the correlation was very strong.'2 2 By contrast,
there were significant correlations between satisfaction with litiga-
tion process and faith in litigation for all three types of respondents.
Moreover, the correlations were of roughly similar magnitude for all
three groups, despite the sharp differences in the three groups' rat-
ings of the two variables.
TABLE 4. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN FAITH IN LITIGATION AND
SATISFACTION WITH LITIGATION EXPERIENCE
Outside Inside
Variable Counsel Counsel Executives
Satisfaction with results in their experiences -.06 .30* .54*
with litigation
Satisfaction with process in their experiences .40** .48** .38**
with litigation
** p < .01
These results indicate that faith in litigation was strongly associ-
ated with individuals' assessments of their own experiences with liti-
gation. Perhaps surprisingly, for the outside counsel, satisfaction
120. For each type of respondent, I conducted regression analyses examining the
relationships between faith in litigation and satisfaction with litigation results and
process. For discussion of regression analysis, see supra note 115. For the outside
counsel, satisfaction with the process was strongly related to faith in litigation, con-
sistent with the correlations. For some unknown reason, regression analysis of
outside counsel's faith in litigation on satisfaction with the results of their exper-
iences in litigation indicated a significant negative relationship, i.e., analysis sug-
gested that the greater the satisfaction, the less the counsel's faith. This is hard to
explain. It seems more likely that there is no clear significant relationship as sug-
gested by the correlation coefficient in Table 4. See id.
121. For inside counsel, a regression analysis involving a model with satisfaction
with both litigation results and process indicated no significant relationship between
faith in litigation and satisfaction with litigation results. This suggests that although
satisfaction with litigation results was related to faith in litigation for inside counsel,
it was not as directly related as satisfaction with the process. See id.
122. For executives, a regression analysis involving a model with satisfaction with
both litigation results and process indicated no significant relationship between faith
in litigation and satisfaction with litigation process; this was the opposite pattern as
that for the inside counsel. This suggests that although satisfaction with litigation
process was related to faith in litigation for executives, it was not as directly related
as satisfaction with the results. See id
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with the process but not the results was relevant to their faith in
litigation. An explanation for this phenomenon is that, as repeat-
player litigators, outside counsel recognize that they can expect to
lose in a substantial percentage of cases, but that the cases will "aver-
age out" over time. 123 This is exemplified by the attorney who de-
scribed how he expects to be surprised by the outcomes in some cases
and is psychologically prepared for that.124 On the other hand, re-
gardless of the favorability of the outcome, one could expect that the
process will almost always be appropriate. For inside counsel, faith
in litigation was especially associated with their assessment of the
quality of the litigation process in their experience, but it was also
related to their satisfaction with the results. Executives' faith in liti-
gation was also related to satisfaction with both process and results
but the relative magnitude is the opposite of that for the inside coun-
sel. For the executives, the results were much more strongly related
to their faith in litigation, perhaps because they can understand the
results better than the process, they value the results more than the
attorneys, or the process has little abstract value for them. In addi-
tion, they continue to live with the results of litigation much more
than the private firm attorneys who move on to new cases as old ones
terminate. Inside counsel and especially executives may have a lot
more at stake in litigation because they may have fewer cases to "av-
erage out" over time.' 25 By contrast, outside counsel paid on an
hourly basis are paid regardless of the litigation outcome.
As Table 5 shows, none of the expected consequences of increased
litigation 26 are significantly correlated with faith in litigation except
for executives' expectations about the effect of increased litigation on
their opportunities to do satisfying work. This one significant find-
ing is consistent with the preceding set of correlations suggesting
that executives' faith in litigation is strongly associated with their
123. To use a simplistic example, assuming only cases with two parties in which
one wins and the other loses, parties (and their attorneys) can expect to lose half the
time, other things being equal. Real life is not so simple and many lawyers may well
assume that they can "beat the odds," but even so, most attorneys probably recognize
that they will lose a significant proportion of their cases.
124. See supra text accompanying note 56.
125. Evaluations of Chicago residents in a 1984-85 survey were more similar to
the outside counsel than the executives. In that study, evaluation of police and courts
was most related to perceptions of fairness in the procedures used by the authorities,
with virtually no effect of perceived favorability of outcomes. TYLER, supra note 48, at
102-03. Tyler's analysis combined evaluations of courts and police and used multiple
questions to develop a scale of "evaluation" of these authorities, unlike the analysis in
the present study.
126. See supra Part V.C.
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satisfaction (or, for most executives, dissatisfaction) in their personal
experiences with-and expectations of-litigation.
TABLE 5. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN FAITH iN LITIGATION AND
EXPECTED PERSONAL CONSEQUENCES OF
INCREASED LITIGATION
Outside Inside
Variable Counsel Counsel Executives
Increased compensation -. 04 -. 16 -. 19
Increased opportunities for advancement -. 08 -. 04 .13
Increased relative importance within their -. 22 -. 09 .05
firm
Increased ability to work independent of -. 06 .17 .11
direction of colleagues in other professions
Increased ability to do work they find very .12 .10 .40**
satisfying
** p < .01
These results showing lack of other significant correlations be-
tween faith in litigation and expected consequences of increased liti-
gation might be especially surprising given the widespread
perception that lawyers and businesspeople are materialistic and
self-interested. This survey suggests that other factors are much
more important to business lawyers and executives in influencing
their faith in litigation.
As Table 6 shows, the correlates of faith in litigation with specific
perceptions about litigation are remarkably similar for inside counsel
and executives. Moreover, the pattern of correlations for outside
counsel differs dramatically from the inside counsel and executives.
For the outside counsel, faith in litigation is most associated with
their perceptions of the timeliness and costs of litigation and, to a
lesser extent, the sensitivity of the courts to the needs of busi-
nesses.127 The two principal factors, time and cost, are performance
measures of case-processing capabilities independent of the quality of
the process or the results. By contrast, the degree of the outside
127. Although most outside counsel gave negative assessments of the litigation
process regarding time and cost, the positive correlations indicate that the lawyers
who had more favorable assessments of litigation on these dimensions also had more
faith in litigation.
Regression analysis of a model including appropriateness of both time and cost
suggests that outside counsel's faith in litigation is more directly related to concern
about cost than timeliness as the latter is not significant in this model. For discussion
of regression analysis, see supra note 115.
Spring 1998]
HeinOnline  -- 3 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 45 1998
Harvard Negotiation Law Review
counsel's faith in litigation is not associated with perceptions about
the somewhat more abstract characterizations of litigation explo-
sions, frivolous lawsuits, fairness of results, integrity of the fact-find-
ing process, and quality of jury performance.
TABLE 6. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN FAITH IN LITIGATION AND
SPECIFIC OPINIONs ABOUT LITIGATION
Outside Inside
Variable Counsel Counsel Executives
Existence of a litigation explosion in past 10
years
Frequent suits so frivolous that they should
not have been filed
Court results are often fair
Courts are a good means of finding truth
Legal rules and precedents provide useful
guidelines for structuring business relations
Courts help restrain inappropriate business
practices
Juries often do a good job of determining
liability
Juries often do a good job of assessing
damages
Juries use a higher standard in judging
businesses than individuals
Lawsuits involving business divert resources
from more productive activities
Courts consider needs of particular business
communities
Cases are often resolved at an appropriate
'ost
Cases are often resolved within an
appropriate amount of time
.11 .15 .24









-. 10 .20 .47**
.06 .29* .30*





* p < .05 ** p < .01
For inside counsel, faith in litigation was strongly associated
with the integrity of the litigation process. This relationship is re-
flected in the association of faith in litigation with beliefs about
whether juries do a good job of determining damages and whether
litigation is a good way to find the truth, produce fair results, and
restrain inappropriate business practices. This pattern of correla-
tions is similar for executives except that the executives' faith in liti-
gation is also strongly correlated with perceptions of frequent
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frivolous suits and whether juries do a good job of determining liabil-
ity, but not correlated with perceptions of court restraint on inappro-
priate business practices. Thus inside counsel's and executives'
assessments of litigation were largely related to the quality of the
process and especially the results. As suggested above, inside coun-
sel and especially executives may be less willing and able to "average
out" a loss, so even a single loss may be quite upsetting, particularly
if they believe the decision to be wrong. Many executives felt espe-
cially embattled by the threat of juries making what they perceive to
be irrational decisions against businesses, and this seems to have
colored their views of litigation generally.
In addition to the respondents' own perceptions of litigation, re-
spondents' faith in litigation was strongly associated with their per-
ceptions of the views of important classes of individuals in their
professional lives (see Table 7). The respondents' own evaluation of
litigation was significantly correlated with their perceptions of their
organizational superiors' views. This is one of the few areas of simi-
larity between all three groups of respondents. Although respon-
dents' views were strongly correlated with their perceptions of their
superiors' views, as noted above, the majority of each group of respon-
dents had more faith in litigation than they believed their superiors
did.2
TABLE 7. CORRELATIONs BETWEEN FAITH IN LITIGATION AND
PERCEIVED OPINIONS OF SIGNIFICANT INDIVIDUALS
Outside Inside
Variable Counsel Counsel Executives
Organizational superiors believe that court .39"* .37 *  .50 **
system is working well
Professional leaders believe that court system .40** .04 .50=
is working well
Top corporate executives are often satisfied .09 -. 05 .37z -
with court results
**p <.01
Interestingly, for the outside counsel and the executives, the
strong correlations between faith in litigation and perceived opinions
of leaders in the respondents' profession are virtually identical to the
correlation between faith in litigation and perceived opinions of orga-
nizational superiors. This may reflect a major overlap between the
two classes of influential individuals. In other words, for outside
128. See supra Part V.H.
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counsel and executives, the same kinds of people may be both their
organizational superiors and professional leaders. This is clearly not
the case for inside counsel as bar leaders are likely to be outside
counsel and their organizational superiors are often non-lawyers.
This may account for the dramatic difference between the correla-
tions of inside counsel's views with the perceived views of their orga-
nizational superiors (which is highly statistically significant) and
with those of their professional leaders (which is not significant).
This disparity suggests that the inside counsel generally identified
with executives' views but did not identify with the (perceived) views
of bar leaders, and, indeed, may have been quite alienated from
them.
VII. THREE VIEWS OF LITIGATION
One of the striking findings of this study is that the three groups
of respondents have remarkably different patterns of opinions about
litigation. This Part summarizes the distinctly different views of
these three different populations.
A. Outside Counsel
The outside counsel in this study tended to be in their 30s and
40s and have been with their firms since the mid-1980s. They tended
to work in medium- to large-sized law firms located in the major cit-
ies in their states. About half the sample consisted of attorneys who
were equity partners in their firms. The vast majority of their legal
careers and current work had been and continued to be devoted to
litigation. They generally represented business enterprises in a wide
variety of industries. Although they typically represented defend-
ants, a considerable portion of their caseload involved representation
of plaintiffs as well. Almost all had some experience with ADR pro-
ceedings, including about half who had served as neutrals.
As a group, outside counsel had a generally favorable view of liti-
gation with some qualifications. They generally believed that rela-
tively few suits are truly frivolous, though about half believed that
there has been a litigation explosion in recent years. As a group, they
were very pleased with the results of litigation, which they typically
believed to be fair, though they were ambivalent about the process of
litigation. A majority believed that juries usually do a good job of
determining liability but a poor job of assessing damages. They were
most critical of the time and expense involved in litigation. This criti-
cism appears to be related to a combination of their own frustrations
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from working in the system and a recognition of their clients' frustra-
tions. Almost two-thirds believed that the courts were not particu-
larly sensitive to businesses' concerns, and many believed that top
corporate executives were lukewarm at best about the results of liti-
gation. On a personal level, they strongly associated increased litiga-
tion with their own personal interests including compensation,
professional advancement, and prestige. They were less certain
about the positive effects of increased litigation on their professional
autonomy or work satisfaction, but most believed that it would help
or at least not hurt them. Thus outside counsel had fairly positive
views about litigation, albeit with some reservations. One lawyer
summarized the sentiments of many outside counsel when he said
that "litigation is a good dispute resolution mechanism .... It's a
shame that it's so hard to get to."' 2 9
Why do outside counsel generally have faith in the system of liti-
gation? Although this study cannot provide definitive answers, 30 it
is quite suggestive. The findings suggest that this faith is related to
two general factors: (1) the degree of support from a network of influ-
ential players in their lives, and (2) the degree of satisfaction with the
litigation process. There are several findings relating to support of
influential people in lawyers' lives.'13 Greater faith in litigation was
associated with perceptions about favorable opinions of their superi-
ors and bar association leaders. Younger lawyers in bigger firms
(who thus have the largest and most influential set of superiors and
other opinion leaders) generally had the greatest confidence among
129. Interview with outside counsel 1 (Mar. 17, 1994).
130. For a discussion of some limitations in possible causal inferences based on
this kind of study, see note 115, supra. In addition, the strongest inferences are lim-
ited to the population sampled. The population of outside counsel included only those
currently employed as such who, by definition, continue to invest their professional
identities in litigation, unlike former litigators who were dissatisfied and switched to
other professional activities.
131. This is an association where causal processes seem especially opaque. Con-
ceivably some respondents "read" the views of influential people on a range of matters
which then influences the respondents to adjust their own views, consciously or un-
consciously, to emulate them. Of course, this learning could operate in both directions
so that the influentials adopt opinions they hear from the rank-and-file. A third possi-
ble process might be that some individuals believe that the influential people are sim-
ilar to them in various ways and thus infer that the influentials' views mirror their
own views. There may also be a selection process in which prospective employees and
superiors make decisions to work together based on a perceived match on issues such
as these. Conceivably all of these dynamics might be at work.
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the outside counsel.132 Similarly, the more that outside counsel be-
lieved that courts consider the needs of businesses, their primary cli-
ents, the greater their confidence in the system.
Faith in litigation was also related to several factors regarding
the process of litigation. Most directly, the outside counsel's overall
faith in litigation was strongly associated with their satisfaction with
the process of litigation in their personal experience. Faith in litiga-
tion was also related to their perceptions about the costs and timeli-
ness of litigation. These are factors over which lawyers have more
control than litigation results and most cases could, at least in the-
ory, be handled well. Moreover, as most lawyers and clients have
negative perceptions of the time and cost of litigation, it makes sense
that outside counsel who are the least critical of the process in these
respects would have the most faith in litigation. Their confidence
was also inversely related to the amount of experience as a partisan
in an ADR proceeding: Outside counsel with less ADR experience
have greater faith in litigation. This correlation may signify satisfac-
tion with litigation and/or ignorance of alternatives. 133
It is worth noting numerous factors that, perhaps surprisingly,
do not seem to explain outside counsel's faith in litigation. Their
level of faith does not seem to be related to the percentage of their
work devoted to litigation, or the proportions of their clients who
were businesses or were defendants. Their faith in litigation seems
to be completely unrelated to their expectations about how it affected
their self-interest in compensation, prestige, advancement, auton-
omy, or work satisfaction. Perhaps most surprising of all is that their
faith in litigation was not significantly related to the extent of their
satisfaction with litigation results or their perception of top execu-
tives' satisfaction with litigation results.
132. There are several possible interpretations of the findings that the outside
counsel's faith in litigation was inversely related to their age and experience in prac-
tice. That is, the younger attorneys were most enthusiastic and the older veterans
were more resigned, as reflected by the comments about "litigation not being as much
fim as it used to be." See supra text accompanying note 52. This may reflect a natural
aging process in which the rigors of litigation increasingly take their toll on attorneys
over time. This finding may also reflect changes in the world of litigation in recent
decades. The veterans may base their more critical assessments on comparisons with
their recollections of litigation as practiced earlier in their careers, often character-
ized as reflecting greater civility and trust. More recent cohorts of business litigators
would have less, if any, experience with a perceived (and perhaps quite real) "Golden
Era."
133. This is another situation where it is difficult to sort out causal effects. Coun-
sel who are relatively dissatisfied with litigation may seek out alternative procedures.
Instead or in addition, those with more ADR experience may become more conscious
of dissatisfactions with litigation by comparison.
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B. Executives
The executives in this study tended to be in their 40s and 50s
and had been with their firms since the early to mid-1980s. By virtue
of the sample selection procedure, they were senior executives in pub-
licly held firms. 13 4 Generally the firms were relatively small and in-
dependent rather than wholly-owned subsidiaries of larger
corporations. They had few lawyers on staff and thus were likely to
rely heavily on outside counsel when they needed legal services.
When the firms were parties in lawsuits, they were almost always
defendants. Very few of the executives had any personal experience
with ADR.
In stark contrast with outside counsel, executives had little good
to say about litigation. Most said that they were dissatisfied with the
results in their experience with litigation and even more were dissat-
isfied with the process. Most believed that the courts are not sensi-
tive to the needs of businesses. Many had doubts about the process of
finding the facts, especially when juries make the decisions, and
questioned the fairness of court outcomes. They were virtually unan-
imous that there has been a litigation explosion, and the vast major-
ity believed that most suits by individuals against businesses are
frivolous. They were very frustrated by the time and expense in-
volved in litigation, which they found especially disturbing consider-
ing that they believed that most suits by individuals against
businesses have no merit. About half believed that their organiza-
tional superiors and professional leaders were even more critical of
litigation than they were. On a personal level, most saw no benefit to
increased litigation. Though most did not believe that it would affect
their personal advancement, large majorities thought that it would
reduce their autonomy from (and thus increase their dependence on)
lawyers and would decrease their work satisfaction. Thus, in con-
trast to the feeling of many outside counsel, litigation is decidedly no
fun for most executives.
One of the factors associated with the level of executives' faith in
litigation is the amount of experience they had had as a party to a
lawsuit; the more often they had been a party, the less faith they
had. Their faith was even more strongly associated with the degree
of their satisfaction with the process and especially the results in
their litigation experience. Thus the extremely low satisfaction with
134. See supra text accompanying note 28.
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their own litigation experience was strongly related to their low ap-
proval ratings of litigation. In the same vein, the belief that in-
creased litigation would reduce their personal opportunities to do
work they found satisfying was also related to their lack of faith in
litigation. This lack of faith was firmly connected to perceptions of a
large volume of frivolous lawsuits as well as of litigation being an
untrustworthy mechanism for finding the truth and producing fair
results, especially when juries are involved. Even more than outside
counsel, executives' overall views of litigation were strongly corre-
lated with the perceived views of their organizational superiors and
the leaders of their professions. As a group, they widely share a fear
and loathing of litigation, distinguishing themselves from their lead-
ers in that (they believe that) their own antipathy is somewhat less
intense. In sum, their lack of faith in litigation seemed to be related
to their perception of the process as being repugnant and the results
unjust. Interestingly, the survey results suggest that executives'
(lack of) faith was not related to expectations about consequences of
litigation for them personally or even their perceptions of the time
and cost involved. Though this study does not show whether the exec-
utives ever had much faith to lose, it does suggest that they now have
very little faith in litigation.
C. Inside Counsel
This study suggests that the inside counsel are hybrids, in most
respects sharing or blending characteristics of outside counsel and
executives. As a group, they were roughly the same age as outside
counsel and had been at their current positions about the same
length of time. Compared with the executives, they worked in larger
firms that had more lawyers on staff and that were more likely to
have legal departments. Almost half the firms were wholly owned
subsidiaries of other firms and the inside counsel therefore were
likely to be part of a larger legal operation under the direction of the
parent company's legal department. Although more than half of their
work was devoted to litigation, they spent a larger portion of their
time on other activities than did outside counsel and a larger part of
their careers had focused on activities other than litigation. Like the
executives' firms, when inside counsel's firms were involved in litiga-
tion, they were almost always defendants. Almost all inside counsel
had some experience with ADR, though not quite as much as did
outside counsel.
Inside counsel's views generally reflect some intermediate point
between outside counsel's and executives' perspectives. As a group,
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they were not as approving of litigation as the outside counsel or as
critical as the executives. Like outside counsel, most inside counsel
were satisfied with the results in their experience with litigation and
thought that litigation outcomes generally were fair. They were con-
siderably less satisfied about the process. More like the executives,
the vast majority of inside counsel believed that at least half of suits
by individuals against businesses were frivolous and that there had
been a litigation explosion in recent years. They expressed qualms
about the factfinding process, especially by juries, and believed that
the courts are not especially sensitive to businesses' concerns. They
were also frustrated by the time and expense involved in litigation,
again much like the executives were. Though inside counsel's views
were somewhat similar to both other groups, they were aware of the
differences between outside counsel and executives, and it seems
likely that inside counsel sometimes felt caught in the middle. Inside
counsel generally perceived that their organizational superiors are
much more critical of litigation than they themselves are and that
bar association leaders (who are primarily lawyers in private firms)
are more satisfied about litigation than the inside counsel are. On a
personal level, most did not believe that increased litigation involving
their firms would affect their compensation or advancement, but two-
thirds believed that it would enhance their prestige within their
firms. They were divided about the effect of increased litigation on
autonomy from their superiors and work satisfaction, though plurali-
ties believed that it would improve each somewhat.
Inside counsel's faith in litigation was significantly correlated
with satisfaction with the results and especially the process in their
experiences with litigation. Their faith was strongly associated with
perceptions about the fairness of court results. In particular, it was
related to their critical evaluation of juries' assessment of damages
and the courts' ability to determine the truth. Like the other groups
of respondents, inside counsel's faith in litigation was associated with
perceptions of organizational superiors' views of litigation, but, un-
like outside counsel and executives, inside counsel's faith in litigation
was not associated with the perceived views of leaders of their profes-
sion. Their faith in litigation was also related to the proportion of
their career in which they focused primarily on litigation. 135 Like
the executives, inside counsel's faith apparently was not related to
135. Given the range of opportunities to do other kinds of work in law firms and
business firms, this positive correlation may be more a matter of self-selection than
positive experiences with litigation.
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expectations about consequences of litigation for them personally or
their perceptions of the time and cost involved.
This study suggests that inside counsel often find themselves
caught between the opposing forces of colleagues from their profes-
sion and their firms, resulting in a more complex and ambivalent
view of litigation than that held by either set of colleagues. On one
hand, managing a process that their bosses find so mysterious, dan-
gerous, and repulsive is a source of professional power and prestige
for inside counsel within their firms. Through professional socializa-
tion and experience, they develop skills in and appreciation for litiga-
tion that executives rarely attain. On the other hand, inside counsel
often feel frustrated with litigation by the very same things that
drive their non-lawyer superiors crazy and which they are unable to
control.
Presumably most inside counsel at one time did have faith in liti-
gation. This study suggests that, to varying degrees, many of them
had lost some of the faith during their careers.'3 6 Inside counsel be-
lieved that the litigation system generally worked properly in ulti-
mately producing appropriate results, but many had lost confidence
in the process for producing the results. Like the executives, they
saw the system as growing out of control with frivolous suits and un-
fair jury awards, but they were more accepting of litigation as a nec-
essary evil.
VIII. BUILDING FAITH IN LITIGATION
These findings strongly suggest that litigators in private firms
generally do have some faith in the litigation system (though they
would like to see it improved), but business executives (and, to a
lesser extent, inside counsel) have much less faith. Given these views,
what would be needed to increase lawyers' and executives' faith in
the litigation process? Part VIII.A sketches some possible answers to
that question, suggesting that court management techniques might
address outside counsel's concerns, while privatization of dispute res-
olution would seem to address inside counsel's and especially execu-
tives' concerns. Part VIII.B briefly outlines some cautions about a
privatization strategy.
136. For a compelling expression of an extreme loss of faith, see text accompany-
ing note 94, supra.
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A. Possible Futures of Litigation
It may be helpful to consider several possible futures for the
courts that Professors Lawrence B. Solum 137 and Robert A. Baruch
Bush 138 envisioned separately. Each developed five similar scenarios
that are useful in analyzing what might build faith in litigation. 139
One scenario is that the courts would not fundamentally change their
mission of adjudicating legal rights.1 40 A second scenario involves
multi-door courthouses where courts acting as "expert ADR manag-
ers"141 who selectively send some cases out for various forms of ADR
and retain a relatively pure model of adjudication only for cases con-
sidered truly suited for adjudication.' 42 A third scenario relies in-
creasingly on administrative agencies for handling multiple cases
involving recurrent issues such as workers' compensation and mass
tort cases. 14 Bush suggested a fourth scenario in which substantive
and procedural legal rules are simplified by "bring[ing] ADR features
into court procedures," such as by changing the role of the judge from
a relatively passive umpire in an adversarial system to an active trial
manager in an inquisitorial model, as used in some European civil
137. Lawrence B. Solum, Alternative Court Structures in the Future of the Califor-
nia Judiciary: 2020 Vision, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 2121 (1993).
138. Robert A. Baruch Bush, Alternative Futures: Imagining How ADR May Affect
the Court System in Coming Decades, 15 REv. LrrIG. 455 (1996).
139. These scenarios are not mutually exclusive; they are described separately for
convenience of analysis. Presumably, real choices involve a combination of features
and the scenarios are helpful for identifying priorities. See id. at 456, 465, 468; see
also Solum, supra note 137, at 2165.
140. Solum referred to this as the "traditional justice" scenario, Solum, supra note
137, at 2132-39, and Bush described this scenario as one where the courts might be-
come "more purely adjudicative." Bush, supra note 138, at 463-66.
141. Bush, supra note 138, at 457-60.
142. See Solum, supra note 137, at 2146-53. Solum included a separate "commu-
nity-based justice" scenario in which state agencies channel disputes to local agencies
where decisions are made based on community norms using informal procedures. Id.
at 2160-65. While these forums are distinguishable from the court-connected proce-
dures typically associated with the multi-door courthouse concept, both scenarios in-
volve the courts as a clearinghouse and referral agent for distributing disputes to
procedures considered to be appropriate. There is a segment of the community justice
movement that avoids taking court referrals, preferring to operate more directly from
the community. This segment of the field belongs more in the privatization scenario
described below. See infra text accompanying notes 137-39. For an evaluation of one
of the best-known attempts at this brand of privatization, the San Francisco Commu-
nity Boards Program, see THE PossmuErrY oF POPULAR JUSTICE: A CASE STUDY OF
Co~muinqTy MEDIATION IN T=E UNITED STATES (Sally Engle Merry & Neal Milner,
eds., 1993).
143. See Solum, supra note 137, at 2153-60. Bush referred to this process as di-
vesting cases to bureaucratic entities. He noted that this scenario is essentially a
special case of the second scenario in which the state is actively involved in channel-
ing cases to different procedures. Bush, supra note 138, at 467-69.
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law courts.'4 A fifth scenario involves what might be considered
true "privatization" 145 or "private ordering" 146 in which disputants
increasingly handle disputes through some combination of market
and community mechanisms with little or no involvement of the
courts or other state agencies. 147
Most courts in the United States currently reflect some combina-
tion of the first three scenarios to varying degrees. Courts directly or
indirectly promote settlement 148 in most cases, direct some cases to
other dispute resolution procedures, and adjudicate the small propor-
tion of cases not otherwise disposed. 149 Although the courts have
adopted various reforms to streamline the process and increase the
courts' role in managing it, such reforms retain the basic structure of
litigation. For example, under the Civil Justice Reform Act, selected
federal courts have recently experimented with (1) differential case
management, (2) early judicial management of litigation, (3) monitor-
ing and control of complex cases, (4) encouragement of voluntary and
cooperative discovery procedures, (5) promotion of good-faith efforts
to resolve discovery disputes before filing motions, and (6) referral of
appropriate cases to ADR programs. 15° These federal court experi-
ments were evaluated by RAND's Institute for Civil Justice which
estimated that the median time expended to dispose of cases could be
reduced by 30% by adopting early judicial management techniques
including setting the trial schedule early and reducing the length of
144. See Bush, supra note 138, at 460-63. Solum's typology does not include a
clear counterpart of this scenario. See Solum, supra note 137.
145. Solum, supra note 137, at 2139-46.
146. Bush, supra note 138, at 469-72.
147. In fact, most private courts typically rely on public resources more than is
commonly supposed. See generally Marc Galanter & John Lande, Private Courts and
Public Authority, 12 STUD. IN L. POL. & Soc'y 393 (1992); Richard C. Reuben, Public
Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L.
REV. 577 (1997). For further discussion of the public and private nature of dispute
resolution, see supra Part VIII.B.
148. See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and
Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1340 (1994) ("Over the past five
decades, first state and then federal judges have embraced active promotion of settle-
ment as a major component of the judicial role.").
149. Although the courts make important decisions in some of the cases that do
not get to a full-dress trial, the vast majority of cases do not get the courts' individual
attention for adjudication of any issue. See Kritzer, supra note 46, at 163.
150. 28 U.S.C. § 473(a) (1997); see JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF
JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JusTIcE REFORM ACT xviii (1996).
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the discovery period.' 5 ' These reforms are consistent with tradi-
tional efforts of the legal profession to "tinker with but not change
th[e] general setup" of litigation.'5 2 Indeed, this reluctance fits with
the views of outside counsel in this study who, by and large, were
generally satisfied with litigation but would simply prefer it to be
cheaper, quicker, and easier.
This study suggests that such litigation reforms are not likely to
restore the faith of business executives. Consider executives such as
the one who was outraged because he had incurred $40,000 in legal
fees to get rid of (what he considered to be) a "bullshit lawsuit."15 3
Are they likely to be satisfied if litigation is streamlined so that they
can get rid of such cases in 30% less time and for 30% less money?' 4
I suspect not.'55 The factors associated with their faith in litigation
go much more to the quality of the process and the merits of the out-
comes. To be satisfied, this study suggests that they would need to
feel that individuals should take responsibility for their own actions
and should not even file frivolous suits in the first place. 15 6 In a
world where executives have real faith in litigation, in the relatively
few cases that would be filed, the premium would be on getting the
results right and fair, presumably by judges (rather than juries) who
are not biased against business interests. Moreover, the conduct of
litigation as a whole would be geared to efficiently producing the "cor-
rect" results.
There is evidence that in recent decades litigants (or more likely,
their attorneys) have increasingly used rough tactics in litigation and
151. See id- at 91 (applicable to general civil cases with issue joined that do not
close within the first nine months). These reforms did not significantly reduce litiga-
tion costs because "lawyers seem to do much the same work but in a shorter time
period." Id at 90.
152. Bryant Garth, From Civil Litigation to Private Justice: Legal Practice at War
with the Profession and its Values, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 931, 935-38 (1993) (the bar has
traditionally engaged in civil justice reform activities to promote the legitimacy of the
courts and the legal profession).
153. See supra text accompanying note 81.
154. As noted above, the reforms measured in the RAND study were not found to
significantly reduce litigation costs. See supra note 151. The hypothetical reduction
of costs is suggested for the sake of argument.
155. Results in this study are consistent with a 1992 survey of Californians includ-
ing lawyers and members of the general public. In response to an open-ended ques-
tion asking about their main desires for the future of the court system, members of
the public were more likely to focus on a desire for fair trials with good quality deci-
sions. By contrast, most attorneys focused on technical issues related to the system
being overcrowded and backlogged. Ellers, supra note 48, at 2192-93.
156. See supra Part VII.B.
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"strategic litigation," in which litigation is used to merely to gain eco-
nomic advantage rather than vindicate a substantive legal right.15 7
Bryant Garth provided an excellent overview of the increase in vol-
ume and nastiness of major business litigation in the 1970s and
1980s when "litigation tactics escalate[d] the conflicts by using
whatever tools [were] available to pressure the other side into a
favorable settlement."5 8 Litigation was not about vindicating rights;
it was about winning a war in which competitive pressures on busi-
ness firms and law firms legitimized use of "scorched earth" litigation
tactics by which litigators "could make life so miserable ... that [the
other side] would eventually have to surrender."159 These tactics in-
cluded motions to disqualify attorneys for conflicts of interest, disin-
genuous games with discovery and motion practice, and use of
lawsuits as a strategy to intimidate the other side.' 60 Virtually every
aspect of a case in litigation could be disputed. Even rules to protect
against frivolous actions became weapons in adversarial combat:
"Adversarial lawyers can run up the costs, generate delays and multi-
ply the pressures to settle by, for example, charging the other side
with a frivolous filing or motion."16 These tactics of strategic litiga-
tion are typically used in major suits rather than routine litigation.
Thus many executives probably feel that they are being tracked by
hungry wolves in big litigation or swarmed by stinging bees in
smaller, routine litigation. Whether the litigation is large or small, it
is not hard to understand why business executives would find it so
distasteful.
If the traditional model of litigation-even with procedural re-
forms such as early and tight judicial management of pretrial litiga-
tion, including aggressive referrals to ADR procedures16 2-is not
157. See generally Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A De-
mand Side Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869, 875 (1990).
158. Garth, supra note 152, at 943; see also Kagan, supra note 13, at 45-53.
159. Garth, supra note 152, at 943-44 (quoting DAVID MARGOLICK, UNDUE INFLU-
ENCE 198 (1993)).
160. See id. at 939-45.
161. Id. at 949. See also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the
Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adult.
hood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsp. RESOL. 297, 321 (1996) (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11 prohibiting submission of statements not well grounded in law, fact, or argument
has been "quickly and frequently applied to a wide range of disputes, sometimes
harshly, unfairly, and erroneously").
162. Some might suggest that litigation would earn more confidence if the courts
acted more as ADR managers, referring substantial portions of their dockets to ADR
procedures. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text. Such a solution assumes
that litigants would find that ADR procedures would result in outcomes that are (per-
ceived to be) correct and fair. While this is certainly possible, it is also quite plausible
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sufficient to earn executives' faith, what about Bush's scenario involv-
ing simplification of substantive and procedural law and an inquisito-
rial model of adjudication with European-style judicial control of
trials? 6 3 Professor Robert Kagan's insightful analysis of adversari-
alism in the U.S. suggests that our legal system is deeply rooted in
our political and economic culture and structure, l 64 and thus it would
require fundamental social change to produce such a change in the
legal system. Kagan characterized our legal system as one of "legal
adversarialism," a system relying on recognition of legal rights in ju-
dicial forums requiring party initiative generally acted upon through
lawyers. 165 In contrast, other legal systems involve processes relying
more on political or technocratic norms and government control. 166
American political culture is based on long-established values of indi-
vidualism and suspicion of government power. 167 This culture leads
to a fragmented political and economic structure with significant dis-
persal of power within the public sector as well as between the public
and private sectors.' 68 Moreover, citing Lawrence Friedman's book,
Total Justice, Kagan argued that since the 1960s, we have prolifer-
ated legal rules and institutions to satisfy increased expectations
that harms should be prevented, losses should be compensated, and
rights should be vigilantly protected.169 Given the deep distrust of
centralized government power to solve social problems, a system pre-
mised on individuals armed with powerful legal rights seems neces-
sary to satisfy our expectations in a complex technological world
that a large-scale shift of cases into ADR procedures would not generally produce
these results over time and would further undermine faith in litigation. This scenario
is discussed further in Part VIII.B.
163. See supra text accompanying note 144.
164. See generally Kagan, supra note 13.
165. Id. at 3-4. The drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure who had the
abiding faith in adjudication that Resnik described, see supra text accompanying note
1, made precisely these assumptions about the system of litigation. Resnik, supra
note 1, at 506, 513 (stating that the adversarial system presumes that disputants are
more or less evenly matched rational and competent actors, typically represented by
attorneys, who engage in "civilized" legal warfare from which the truth and "correct"
winner will emerge).
166. See Kagan, supra note 13, at 4-5.
167. See id. at 9. See also David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public
Realm, 83 GEo. L.J. 2619, 2626-27 (1995). Professor Luban advocated the value of
adjudication as a means of elaborating public values but recognized that his view goes
against the grain of current American "conventional wisdom about the evils of litiga-
tion and litigiousness." In this political environment where "state interference is [pre-
sumptively considered] an evil .... the idea of the law as a source of meaning and
value for the community is undoubtedly strange." Id
168. See Kagan, supra note 13, at 9-10.
169. Id. at 11-13.
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populated by huge institutions. 170 If Kagan's analysis is correct (as I
believe it is), to adopt major features of European legal systems
would require a massive shift in our political culture and institutions.
Returning to our business executives, who, as a group, are likely to
favor reducing rather than increasing government authority, it seems
especially unlikely that they would favor a European-style legal
system.17 '
This analysis naturally leads to consideration of the last scena-
rio: privatization of dispute resolution. By definition, advocates of
this scenario have little faith in litigation except perhaps to the ex-
tent that the courts authorize or facilitate private dispute resolu-
tion.' 72 Indeed, in recent years, the courts have enthusiastically
promoted private dispute resolution through enforcement of pre-dis-
pute arbitration agreements in a wide range of settings. 73 Thus
businesses can use binding arbitration to avoid litigation in a range
of disputes, such as securities and employment disputes, including
many actions based on statutory rights.' 74 Even without pre-dispute
arbitration agreements, courts can aggressively order cases into me-
diation and non-binding arbitration and some courts are doing just
that.175
170. See generally Kagan, supra note 13. See also Galanter, supra note 18, at
1141 (the greater reliance on tort law in the U.S. compared with European countries
.reflects not greater generosity to victims, but less reliance on administrative controls
and social insurance").
171. I suspect that most business lawyers also would not favor a European-style
system as it would probably reduce their authority and prestige.
172. See generally Galanter & Lande, supra note 147.
173. See Stempel, supra note 161, at 317 n.62, 337-40 (discussing cases establish-
ing general trend of enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in a wide
range of cases); John T. Sant, How Contract Clauses Can Ensure ADR, 15 ALTERNA-
TrvES TO THE HIGH COST OF LiTIG. 146, 147 (1997) (federal courts are broadening cir-
cumstances in which they will enforce pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate); Paul D.
Carrington, ADR and Future Adjudication: A Primer on Dispute Resolution, 15 REV.
LITIG. 485, 499-501 (1996) (critiquing "binding arbitration pursuant to adhesion
contracts").
174. See BETTE J. RoTH ET AL., THE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PRACTICE
GUIDE § 2:2 (1993).
175. See generally Lande, supra note 27 (describing "liti-mediation" environments
in areas where litigation normally ends in mediation). Courts' functioning as "ADR
managers" is the essence of the second scenario described above, see supra text accom-
panying notes 141-42, and is less purely private, see supra text accompanying notes
145-47. In a scenario emphasizing privatization, courts would focus more on shifting
cases out of litigation per se rather than matching cases to an optimal procedure. See
generally Frank E.A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A
User-Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOTIATION J. 49 (1994).
Even wholesale channeling of cases into ADR would not necessarily constitute true
privatization, however, as described infra in Part VIII.B.
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On its face, a privatization scenario should have obvious appeal
to business executives who, by definition, choose to run their own op-
erations in the private sector. Indeed, use of ADR procedures offers
an impressive list of potential benefits including opportunities to de-
velop creative solutions, save time and money, provide greater con-
trol over the third-party neutrals and procedures, increase
satisfaction with the disputing process and results, maintain rela-
tionships, protect privacy, and increase compliance with agreements,
among others.17 6 Thus it is conceivable that reducing court dockets
by increasing use of private procedures might increase executives'
support for litigation. The analysis of executives' antipathy for litiga-
tion in this study suggests that to support a system relying heavily on
private dispute resolution procedures, executives would need to be
satisfied that the system properly focuses on the merits of the dis-
putes and produces appropriate results. In fact, about three-quarters
of the business executives (as well as the lawyers) in this study who
had experience with ADR procedures reported satisfaction with the
results of those experiences. 177 Obviously, however, the satisfaction
with ADR had not "rubbed off" onto executives' opinions about litiga-
tion when they responded to my survey; perhaps it would over time,
if executives credit the courts for promoting privatization, though
that remains to be seen.
B. Cautions About Privatization of Dispute Resolution
Although I firmly believe that ADR procedures can provide im-
portant social benefits,178 most ADR procedures used in the U.S. are
less private than many believe and these procedures do not necessar-
ily get at the truth nor yield resolutions that seem fair. As a result,
176. See Galanter & Lande, supra note 147, at 395-97.
177. Lande, Ideology of Disputing, supra note 7, at 135-37. The survey data sug-
gest that executives' support for ADR-particularly court-ordered arbitration-is
based on a desire to extricate themselves from litigation and dependence on attor-
neys. Id. at 203. Interestingly, executives supported court-ordered arbitration more
often than did the attorneys, who more often preferred mediation. Id. at 165-68.
These findings are consistent with other studies finding that disputants are typically
quite satisfied with ADR procedures. See Tom R. Tyler, The Quality of Dispute Reso-
lution Procedures and Outcomes: Measurement Problems and Possibilities, 66 DEM,.
U. L. Rxv. 419, 429 (1989); John P. Esser, Evaluations of Dispute Processing: We Do
Not Know What We Think and We Do Not Think What We Know, 66 D'rv. U. L. RPv.
499, 532 (1989).
178. The list of potential benefits is well-known even to casual students of dispute
resolution. See supra text accompanying note 176. Although I have expressed con-
cerns about potential dysfunctions of mediation process as it has been institutional-
ized in some places, see Lande, supra note 27, I have greater faith in the potential for
ADR than Professor Resnik does. Resnik, supra note 1, at 544-46.
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ADR may be less of a solution for executives' dissatisfaction with liti-
gation than some would expect.
Although ADR is often thought of as inherently private, much of
the field now manifests a move toward "publicization" (or "litigation-
ization")' 79 rather than increased privatization.180 Galanter distin-
guished remedy systems that are "appended" to the courts (generally
by virtue of being supervised by or oriented to the courts) from more
truly private remedy systems (such as those in various private orga-
nizations including religious institutions, trade associations, ethnic
communities, and gangs and other criminal groupings). 8 ' In these
terms, much of contemporary ADR practice is more oriented toward
the (public) courts than more private institutions. Indeed, with the
current trend toward incorporation of ADR processes into litiga-
tion, 182 ADR practice is becoming increasingly formal and legal-
ized.183 For example, where mediation is routinely ordered as part of
litigation, attorneys often take an especially active role. Attorneys'
statements frequently resemble presentations in court, focus closely
on legal issues, and reflect the dynamics of traditional adversarial
bargaining in litigation. Due to narrow conceptions of mediators' ap-
propriate role and/or concern about losing future referrals from attor-
neys, mediators may be hesitant to interfere with attorneys'
traditional strategies of protecting adversarial advantages through
limited disclosure of information and using positional negotiation
gambits. In these situations, mediation often "blends" into litigation
179. Although the literal opposite of "privatization" would be "publicization," re-
ferring to giving something a public character, the term "publicization" is both awk-
ward and confusing. It is confusing because it could refer to open dissemination of
information, a very different meaning. For lack of a better term, I use "litigationiza-
tion" which has the virtue of being "merely" awkward.
180. I do not suggest that a trend toward litigationization is necessarily bad (or
good). Rather, my point here is that litigationization of private ADR does not neces-
sarily result in the kind of informal procedure that I think many people would associ-
ate with privatization.
181. See Galanter, supra note 21, at 126-30. See also Galanter & Lande, supra
note 147, at 407-10 ("private adjudication is not separate and remote from the public
sphere, but... is confirmed, elaborated, and extended by official legal institutions").
182. With respect to mediation, I have called this "liti-mediation." See Lande,
supra note 26, at 840-41. For an excellent analysis of court-connected ADR pro-
grams, see ELIZABETH PLAPINGER & MARGARET SHAW, COURT ADR: ELEMENTS OF PRO-
GRAMI DESIGN (1992).
183. See, e.g., Bush, supra note 137, at 462. Cf DEZALAY & Garth, supra note 24,
at 54-57. Dezalay and Garth described how international arbitration, which had been
relatively informal and cooperative in prior decades, has become increasingly legal-
ized and adversarial due to increased "American style practice" with "more attention
to fact, motions, objections, delays," technical appeals, and "procedural management."
Id. at 55, 57.
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so that it seems like just another step in the process, especially when
it occurs late in the litigation process.18 4
Where the courts enforce ADR agreements rather than take the
initiative to order cases into ADR proceedings, these proceedings are
also becoming more like litigation and subject to closer court review.
In reviewing recent trends in court decisions involving enforcement
of agreements to arbitrate, Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow con-
cluded that both federal and state courts are increasingly willing to
question the operation of arbitration procedures.' 85 This closer court
supervision is likely to lead to even more litigation-like procedures.
Even when ADR procedures are not regulated by law, associations of
ADR practitioners are pressing to institutionalize procedures with
the result that arbitration looks more like litigation.'1 6 For example,
groups of ADR practitioners concerned about pre-dispute agreements
to arbitrate employment disputes involving statutory claims have de-
veloped a "Due Process Protocol" that specifies procedures these
groups recommend that mediators and arbitrators follow. This proto-
col includes provisions, inter alia, governing representation of em-
ployees, qualification and selection of mediators and arbitrators,
conflicts of interest, and authority of arbitrators to permit discovery,
issue subpoenas, and issue awards.' 8 7
As more cases go into ADR proceedings due to statutory man-
date, expectations of court order, or enforcement of contract provi-
sions, there have been predictable calls for increased regulation.188
184. See Lande, supra note 27, at 879-95.
185. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, California Court Limits Mandatory Arbitration, 15
ALTERNATrvES TO THE HIGH COST OF LTG. 109, 125 (1997). "It is now clear that great
departures (in time, procedures, neutrality and selection of neutrals) from the pro-
grams' promises and actual operation may result in refusals to compel arbitration
through a variety of legal arguments, including waivers, estoppel, rescission of con-
tracts, fraud, contract avoidance, unconscionability, and others." Id.
186. I express no ultimate opinion about whether this litigationization is, on bal-
ance, a good or bad development. I am sympathetic to the concerns leading in that
direction and yet I am concerned about potential adverse effects as well.
187. Task Force on Alternative Dispute Resolution in Employment, A Due Process
Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of the Em.
ployment Relationship, Disp. RESOL. J., Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 37; NAT'L AcAD. OF ARB.,
STATEMENT ON INDIVIDUAL CoNTRACTs OF EMPLOYMFENT AND GUIDELINES ON ARBITRA.
TION OF STATUTORY CLAImS UNDER EMPLOYER-PROMULGATED SYSvTts (1997) (endors-
ing the "Due Process Protocol" and recommending procedures for arbitrators when
they consider whether to take a case, conduct pre-hearing "consultations" and hear-
ings, and issue opinions and awards).
188. See, e.g., Garth, supra note 152, at 959-60 (calling for greater regulation of
and disclosure by ADR providers); Stempel, supra note 161, at 361-95 (offering exten-
sive prescriptions for procedural protections in court-connected ADR to assure accu-
racy and fairness, such as firm scheduling, greater control of fact development by
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Proper regulation requires a tricky balance. Obviously one would
want to protect against common abuses that are normally difficult to
prevent, detect, and correct without some formal regulatory
scheme.189 On the other hand, bureaucratic regulation and rou-
tinization, which seem likely to develop over a period of time, may
strip away the beneficial aspects that make ADR desirable. Resnik
put it well:
Reliance upon some of the procedures associated with adjudica-
tion-visible decision-making, the creation of records, public
scrutiny and participation, and appellate review-is one way in
which to constrain that power, but if we add all those proce-
dures to... an ADR mechanism, have we done anything other
than reinvent the wheel?190
If ADR becomes sufficiently integrated into litigation or substantially
incorporates features of litigation, many people are likely to believe
that ADR no longer provides distinctive advantages. 191 In this scena-
rio, key constituencies may lose faith in both ADR and litigation. 192
As a related matter, this study suggests that for ADR procedures
to gain and maintain confidence of constituencies such as business
neutrals, more pre-decision activity, more reasoning and documentation of the ration-
ale of decisions, and more public reporting of decisions); LAW & PUBLIC POLICY COM-
MITTEE, SOC'Y OF PROF. IN Disp. RESOL., MANDATED PARTICIPATION AND SETTLEMENT
COERCION: DIsPuTE RESOLUTION AS IT RELATES TO THE COURTS (1991) (making recom-
mendations regarding limits on court actions mandating participation in ADR). In-
deed, there is a compelling argument that court-ordered ADR constitutes "state
action" that triggers constitutional due process protections. See generally Reuben,
supra note 147.
189. See Resnik, supra note 1, at 545-46, 552-53 (expressing concern about limited
constraints and accountability in ADR).
190. Resnik, supra note 1, at 554.
191. Detailed discussion of factors associated with business lawyers' and execu-
tives' support for ADR is beyond the scope of this Article. My dissertation provides an
extensive analysis of this issue, see Lande, Ideology of Disputing, supra note 7, at 133-
209, and the findings regarding mediation are summarized in Lande, Relationships
Drive Support for Mediation, supra note 7.
In brief, this survey suggests that support for use of mediation is strongly related
to satisfaction with ADR experiences and perceptions that mediation (or ADR gener-
ally) is sensitive to the needs of business, helps preserve relationships, increases work
satisfaction, and is more a matter of common sense than specialized skill. Support for
court-ordered arbitration is related to satisfaction with ADR experiences and percep-
tions that ADR increases autonomy in handling disputed matters. See Lande, Ideol-
ogy of Disputing, supra note 7, at 185-97, 202-07. Obviously, litigationizing ADR
procedures substantially could certainly change these perceptions and thus under-
mine support for ADR.
192. For a passionate argument in favor of maintaining clear distinctions between
mediation, arbitration, and litigation, see Robert A. Baruch Bush, Efficiency and Pro-
tection, or Empowerment and Recognition? The Mediator's Role and Ethical Stan-
dards in Mediation, 41 FLA. L. REV. 253 (1991).
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executives, they must be convinced that these procedures produce
fair results based on the truth. This has important implications for
the nature of dispute resolution practice. For example, there is a de-
bate about the merits of an evaluative approach to mediation 193 in
which mediators give evaluations of likely litigation outcomes so that
mediation essentially provides a short-cut to the results expected
from litigation. Though many parties no doubt appreciate this ap-
proach to mediation for "saving" them from what they see as the
time, expense, and nastiness of the litigation process, an evaluative
approach risks alienating, some parties who feel pressed to agree to
(something close to) the very court outcomes that they find so appal-
ling. Similarly, if arbitration becomes increasingly legalized, parties
may view arbitration awards as being too similar to the litigation re-
sults that they are trying to avoid. In these situations, parties may
have serious doubts about how much these procedures really do get
at the truth and produce fair results.1 94 Again, this scenario risks
loss of faith in both ADR and litigation.
IX. CONCLUSION
This study suggests that Resnik's assessment of failing faith is
about right for the executives and to some extent the inside counsel,
though not so much for outside counsel. Lawyers, especially younger
lawyers in large law firms, generally have faith in litigation; even
they, however, are somewhat frustrated by it, especially by the cum-
bersome nature of the process. The problems that erode outside
counsel's faith relate primarily to delay and expense of litigation.
Recent experiments in the federal courts suggest that case manage-
ment methods that should theoretically remedy these problems could
reduce delay somewhat but are likely to have little or no effect on
193. For a collection of sources on evaluative mediation, see Lande, supra note 27,
at 842 n.9, 850 n.40; Jeffrey W. Stempel, Beyond Formalism and False Dichotomies:
The Need for Institutionalizing a Flexible Concept of the Mediator's Role, 24 FLA. ST.
U. L. R.v. 949, 951 n.7 (1997). Evaluative mediation is especially common where
former judges populate the ranks of mediators. See Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth,
Fussing About the Forum: Categories and Definitions as Stakes in a Professional Com-
petition, 21 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 285, 303-04 (1996).
194. This survey indicates that support for use of both mediation and court-or-
dered arbitration is strongly related to perceptions that top executives are dissatisfied
with litigation results, and that support for mediation is strongly related to percep-
tions that top executives are satisfied with the results of mediation. See Lande, Ideol-
ogy of Disputing, supra note 7, at 184, 188-89, 192-95, 201, 205-06. If the results of
ADR procedures are seen as similar to litigation results, support for ADR could be
undermined.
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litigation expense. 195 Perhaps improved design or implementation of
case management reforms would make litigation more efficient and
ameliorate the problems. The disappointing results of the federal
court experiments suggest, however, that solving these problems may
require more fundamental changes in litigation and particularly in
our culture of disputing.' 96
Outside counsel's faith is also sapped by a perception that litiga-
tion does not serve their clients' interests well. Indeed, many lawyers
accurately perceive the dismal opinions that executives have about
litigation. In fact, most business executives do not have much faith
in litigation, with views typically ranging from mild displeasure to
total contempt. This study suggests that a substantial portion of ex-
ecutives' displeasure with litigation arises from their own personal
experiences. Many executives harbor great doubts about the integ-
rity of litigation in finding the truth and producing fair results. It
seems unlikely that such doubts would be assuaged simply by chang-
ing cultural accounts of litigation in news and entertainment media
or by making litigation more efficient. Rather, more fundamental
changes in litigation itself would seem necessary to address such
concerns.
The two obvious options are both problematic, though in different
ways. One option is to simplify radically the legal system and shift
greater adjudicatory authority (and resources) to judges. Such
changes, however, are at odds with fundamental American legal and
political values and thus it seems unlikely that such reforms would
be adopted, let alone be implemented systematically.
The second option, increased use of ADR, may also undermine
faith in litigation. Implicitly and often explicitly, ADR is premised
on-and could contribute to-a lack of faith in litigation. Some pro-
ponents of increased use of ADR explicitly base their arguments on
critiques of litigation. 197 Moreover, in many cases, mediators and
195. See KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 150, at 88-91.
196. See supra text accompanying note 81 (attorney stating that "it only takes a
couple of stinkers" taking full advantage of their legal rights to inhibit cooperation
and that judges do not have authority or responsibility to "iron out" all these
problems). See also Milton Heumann & Jonathan Hyman, Negotiation Methods and
Litigation Settlement Methods in New Jersey: "You Can't Always Get What You Want,"
12 OHIo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 253, 254-56, 295-305 (1997) (research suggesting that
lawyers often use a positional process out of habit even though they may prefer a
problem-solving approach).
197. See, e.g., THomAs E. CARBONNEAU, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: MELT.
ING THE LANCES AND DISMOUNTING THE STEEDS (1989); Richard M. Calkins, Mediation:
The Gentler Way, 41 S.D. L. REv. 277, 279-83 (1996); Monica L. Warmbrod, Could an
Attorney Face Disciplinary Actions or Even Legal Malpractice Liability for Failure to
[Vol. 3:1
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lawyers counsel parties in mediation to accept settlement by high-
lighting potential unpleasant vagaries of continued litigation. Con-
tinuation of these approaches seems likely to augment and reinforce
negative opinions about litigation. In addition, if courts order parties
to use ADR procedures and if ADR practice becomes increasingly le-
galized due to court regulation, parties may become disenchanted
and look for alternatives to both litigation and ADR.
Obviously, this is not an inevitable result. Indeed, if ADR pro-
ceedings generally produce results perceived to be based on the truth
and substantively fair, such outcomes are likely to boost the confi-
dence of business executives (and perhaps the public) in ADR and
possibly litigation as well. Indeed, some of the impetus for legaliza-
tion of ADR is precisely to ensure the quality of the results. This
study suggests that providing a satisfying process and results per-
ceived to be fair may be critical to the maintenance and growth of
support for ADR.
More troubling is the question about what can be done to restore
faith in litigation, especially among non-lawyers. In a thoughtful es-
say, David Luban catalogued a variety of public goods produced
through adjudication including development of legal rules and prece-
dents, discovery and publication of important facts, opportunities for
intervention by persons not party to lawsuits, opportunities for struc-
tural transformation of large public and private institutions, and fa-
cilitation and enforcement of private settlements. 193 The legal
system enables economic formation and transactions, deters health
and safety hazards, compensates injuries, protects basic civil rights,
and provides an important forum for debating and establishing social
norms. While litigation is not the only or necessarily the best proce-
dure to promote these public values in every case, it is a crucial part
of our system.199 Just as we do not notice every time a plane lands
Inform Clients of Alternative Dispute Resolution?, 27 CuLam. L. REv. 791, 794-95
(1996-97); ichael E. Weinzierl, Wisconsin's New Court.Ordered ADR Law: Why It Is
Needed and Its Potential For Success, 78 MARQ. L. REv. 583, 584-91 (1995); Jethro K.
Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution Move-
ment, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 424,426-31 (1986). I have made this argument as well. See
John Lande, Mediation Paradigms and Professional Identities, MEDATIONA Q., June
1984, 19, 20-23.
198. Luban, supra note 167, at 2622-26. See also Jack B. Weinstein, Some Benefits
and Risks of Privatization of Justice Through ADR, 11 OMo ST. J. o, Disp. RFsOL.
241, 247-51 (1996) (citing benefits of public dispute resolution). For discussion of how
the courts promote private settlement, see Galanter & Lande, supra note 147; Rich-
ard Lempert, More Tales of Two Courts: Exploring Changes in the "Dispute Settlement
Function" of Trial Courts, 13 L. & Soc'y REv. 91, 99-100 (1978).
199. See generally Kagan, supra note 13.
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safely, we often take for granted the many important contributions of
the legal system that are so routine that we do not even recognize
them. Although it is likely to be beneficial to adopt careful proce-
dures for managing cases in litigation, including shifting some cases
into ADR procedures, this study suggests that these measures alone
are not likely to be sufficient to restore much faith in litigation. In-
deed, it suggests that generating faith in litigation in the U.S. is
likely to be more difficult than one might expect.
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APPENDIX 1
This Appendix describes the procedures used for selecting states
for the telephone survey. Twenty-six smaller states were excluded
from consideration because there were too few potential respondents
in the databases used for sampling. On the other extreme, California
and New York were excluded because they are so large and diverse.
This left 19 intermediate-sized states that were considered based on
their region of the country and what I originally thought of as their
"ADR culture," though it later appeared to measure what might be
called "mediation culture."200 To develop ratings of "ADR culture," I
relied primarily on interviews with six experts who are familiar with
ADR events around the country.20 1 I also developed an objective mea-
sure of state ADR culture based on the existence of important types of
state statutes enacted between 1975 and 1991.202 Experts' ratings
were significantly correlated with the presence of these state ADR
statutes; this indicated that these measures formed a highly reliable
scale of "mediation culture."20 3 Table 8 summarizes the ratings for
200. An analysis of the survey responses suggests that the differences occurred
among opinions about mediation but not arbitration, the other principal ADR proce-
dure, so it is more accurate to refer to a "mediation culture." See Lande, Ideology of
Disputing, supra note 7, at 180-83.
201. These include two officials of a national organization of family court practi-
tioners who have done trainings and worked with ADR organizations around the
country, an official who worked for the American Bar Association Dispute Resolution
Section for more than a decade, a consultant to numerous national ADR organiza-
tions, and a sociologist and law professor who have written extensively on ADR and
who are familiar with events around the country.
These individuals were asked to rate state ADR culture based on their percep-
tions of the (1) volume of cases handled through ADR procedures; (2) level of activity
of ADR organizations, especially community mediation programs; (3) ADR statutes as
implemented; (4) attitudes of lawyers, judges, and legislators; and (5) presence of in-
fluential individuals.
202. The measure of state legislation was based on the number of state statutes
enacted between 1975 and 1991 dealing with family, community, or general civil
cases that authorize: (1) operation of ADR programs, (2) mandatory ADR referrals by
courts, and (3) state-wide bodies specifically dealing with ADR issues, such as advi-
sory commissions. See CorrZE ON Disp. REsOL., A.B.A., LEGISLATION ON DiPstrE
REsOLUTION (1992). These areas were selected because they seem more central to the
current ADR movement than statutes dealing with other more specialized or obscure
areas.
203. Reliability refers to the extent to which a measurement instrument produces
the same results over repeated measurements. If there is no relationship between
repeated measurements, the reliability coefficient is zero. The highest possible relia-
bility coefficient is 1.0. The reliability coefficient of the scale of mediation culture is
0.90, which indicates that the scale is very reliable. See EDARD G. CAmmES &
RiCHARD A. ZELIER, RELABrrY Amw VALmrrv AssFssrm.rr 37-51 (1979).
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the states with a high level of agreement. 20 4 I selected one "strong"
and one "weak" state in each of two regions: Massachusetts and
Pennsylvania, respectively, in the Northeast, and Florida and Ten-
nessee, respectively, in the South. This provided more than one state
for each level of mediation culture and some control over possible re-
gional variation.
TABLE 8. STRENGTH OF STATE ADR CULTURE BY REGION
ADR culture
Region Weak Medium Strong
Northeast Pennsylvania Massachusetts
New Jersey
South Tennessee Georgia Florida
Louisiana




204. Due to insufficient agreement between raters about five states (Indiana,
Oklahoma, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin), these states were not given overall
ratings for strength of mediation culture. See Lande, Ideology of Disputing, supra
note 7, at 49-51.
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